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NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal from an election contest affirming the election. The district court
found a three (3) vote margin between Brannon and Kennedy for Seat 2.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The election contest was timely filed following the election. A six day bench trial
commenced on September 13,2010. Judgment was entered on November 4,2010. Brannon's
motion for a new trial or amended judgment was denied, and this appeal was timely filed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This election contest arose out of what the Chief Deputy Secretary of State labeled "a
violation of the clerk's duty,"\ failure to keep the mandatory absentee ballot record. Brannon
and Kennedy were opposing candidates for Seat 2. The City delegated all election duties to
Kootenai County (County). County employees conducted all aspects of the City'S election.
Neither the City, City Clerk, nor the mayor and council, performed their statutory duties. In
conducting the election, the County failed to perform the City's statutory duties. The failures
include: failing to prepare and maintain the required absentee ballot record,2 failing to verify
each absentee voter was lawfully entitled to vote,3 sending out absentee ballots to nonresidents of the City following federal law instead of state law, and failing to compare the
number of legal absentee ballots documented received by absentee ballot record to the
number counted by machine. 4 The machine count reflected that 2051 absentee ballots were
counted on election night. Upon receiving a request to review the statutorily required
absentee ballot record three days before the scheduled canvass, the County printed its first
Tr. p. 444, I. 5-1l.
Idaho Code § 50-451.
3 Idaho Code 50-445.
4 Idaho Code § 50-464, Idaho Code § 50-465.
I

2
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absentee ballot record. This record documented a total of 2047 absentee ballots were
received, however five "Voided" ballots are included in that number. 5 The election clerk who
prepared the record told her supervisor of the discrepancy the same day. 6 The supervisor
conceded she was aware of it, but claimed the first time she saw it was at the trial.

7

Despite

this discrepancy, no data comparison, and without investigation, the County gave the City the
machine count to consider.
At what was called the City's canvass meeting the City only "accepted" the County's
submitted number. 8 The canvassers merely "rubber stamped,,9 the number the County gave
them. Kootenai County's Prosecuting Attorney was informed the absentee ballot record did
not match the County total. The Prosecutor said he would investigate. IO On November 16,
2009 the same election clerk printed a second absentee ballot record. This second absentee
ballot record again documented that a total of 2041 non-voided absentee ballots had been
returned. II The Prosecutor suggested that the person review of Chapter 20 Title 34 election
contest. 12
The day after the complaint was filed, the attorneys for the City, County, and the other
candidate for Seat 2 (Kennedy) met to devise a coordinated effort to defeat the contest. 13
The concerted effort continued even after the County was removed as a defendant. 14 The

Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, p. 185. English confIrmed, at trial, that this record did not Void one vote of a person,
Harris, for whom two ballots were recorded as being returned. Thus the total non-Voided absentee ballots
returned was 2041.
6 Tr. p. 293, I. 3-9.
7 Tr. p. 669, I. 1-3.
8Tr.p. 101,1. 14-17.
9 May 14,2010 Hearing Tr. p. 41, I. 9-16.
10 Plaintiff's Exhibit 47.
II Plaintiff's Exhibit 8A. See footnote 5 for further information regarding 2041.
12 Plaintiff's Exhibit 47.
13 Plaintiff's Exhibits 48, 50, 51
14 Plaintiffs Exhibit 55 pages 1-2.
5
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County sought a protective

order when Brannon sought to examine the City's election

documents it held the County claimed the examination would cost "at a minimum, $30,000. 15
On April 29, 2010, Brannon sought to review Beard's e-mails from Kootenai County. The
County responded that its former election supervisor's computer had been 'cleared' and her
e-mails "were not available." County's former election supervisor's computer had been
"cleared" and her e-mails "were not available.,,16
Brannon's investigator contacted two voters, Harris and Prior, residing in Hayden but
who voted in City's election. Both persons stated they probably voted for Kennedy. 17 When
their depositions were taken, they could not recall how they voted. At trial they both testified
they could not recall. 18
Brannon subpoenaed for deposition Ainsworth, a county resident who voted in the City
election. With the goading of a Spokane newspaper's internet 'blog', he tried to tum his
deposition into a circus. Ainsworth posted comments on a blog that he "voted legally and
proudly for Mike Kennedy," that he intended to wear a 'Speedo' and an "I love Mike
Kennedy t-shirt" to his deposition, and that he was giving his witness fee check to the "Mike
Kennedy Defense fund." He posted "This is getting FUN:)" Ainsworth's deposition was
cancelled to prevent this circus attitude from escalating. At trial, Kennedy stipulated
Ainsworth voted illegally for him.
The court asked Kennedy's counsel if he wanted to discuss the bond amount.
Kennedy's counsel responded that he would be making an application at a future date. The
district court stated it would be happy to listen. Kennedy's counsel responded that he hadn't
15

R. p. 527-528. When combined with the initial cost order it would have cost $70,000 to begin investigation.

Plaintiffs Exhibit 98.
Tr. p. 762-772.
18 Tr. p. 700-709.
16

17
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done any calculation but suggested $25,000.00. The district court set the bond at
$40,000.00. 19 Brannon sought reconsideration and the bond was reduced to $5,000.
J. Hosack granted reconsideration and made the City and City Clerk parties. 1. Hosack
ordered Sr. Magistrate Eugene Marano to conduct a physical count of all physically existing
absentee ballots that were cast and counted in the election. This count occurred on June 22,
2010 under the direct supervision of Carrie Phillips, the sole custodian of the election
absentee ballots. Philips opened the three marked locked absentee ballot boxes. She told
Marano these absentee ballots "constituted all of the absentee ballots counted in the 2009
City of Coeur d' Alene General Election." Marano counted a total of 2027 absentee ballots.
On July 2, 2011 Marano was asked to do another count. The County's former employee
election supervisor, Beard, who was not and had not been the custodian of the election
ballots since November 30, 2009, gave Marano additional absentee ballots to count. He
counted seven (7). There is no evidence where these ballots came from. Phillips, the sole
custodian of the election ballots, was not present at this count and didn't know about it until
sometime after it occurred. On July 14, 2010 Marano was asked to do another count. Phillips
handed Marano more ballots which she referred to as "duplicate ballots." Marano counted
seventeen (17). There is no evidence where these ballots came from.
On August 5, 2010 Kennedy's counsel filed a motion for the district court to hold a
non-party in contempt of court for posting a copy of his affidavit on the internet. The motion
was supported by another non-party's affidavit who, after being served with a subpoena
posted a comment on the aforementioned 'blog' that she was going contribute the witness
fees to Kennedy. A hearing was held on the contempt complaint on September 7, 2010.

19

March 2, 20lO Hearing Tr. p. 67-68.
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Brannon's counsel was not in attendance but was told J. Hosack had made very disturbing
comments. A copy of the contempt hearing transcript was obtained on September 11, 2010.
After reviewing the transcript Brannon's counseled filed a motion supported by affidavit on
September 13, 2010, because it was a bench trial, to disqualify J. Hosack from presiding on
the grounds of bias and prejudice. 2o The motion was denied.
ARGUMENT

1. It was error to deny Brannon's motion to disqualify.
The standard of review is whether there was an abuse of discretion. 21 This issue is
raised because in a bench trial the consideration of a

motion to disqualify for bias or

prejudice is critical to the fairness of the trial. It is the trial judge's province to make factual
findings and discretionary decisions that impact the trial and its result that are only subject to
deferential review on appeal. A trial court's discretionary decisions will only be set aside for
an abuse of discretion. 22 There are numerous times during a bench trial when a judge, with
bias or prejudice, will make findings, resolve evidentiary issues and determine the credibility
ofwitnesses. 23 Rulings will be tainted by the judge's bias and prejudice and will significantly
impact the trial and the judge's decision. 24 The right to due process under the Idaho and U.S.
Constitutions requires an impartial judge. 25 The court trial was scheduled to commence on
September 13,2010. A motion to disqualify Judge Hosack for cause was filed on September

R. p. 2083.
Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469,903 P. 2d 58 (1995).
22 Arthur v. Shoshone County, 133 1daho 854, 993 P. 2d 61 7 (1daho App. 2000).
23 The district court detennined that two illegal voters' (Harris and Prior) testimony was credible despite the fact
that each told an investigator for Brannon, mere days before their depositions were to be taken, that they voted
for Kennedy. At their depositions, and at trial, they stated they couldn't remember whether they voted for
Kennedy or Brannon. Finding them to be not credible would have made the vote difference, even under the
court's findings, one (1) vote.
24 Arthur v. Shoshone County, 133 Idaho 854,857,993 P. 2d 617 (Idaho App. 2000).
25 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 u.s. 510, 47 S. Ct. 437, 71 L. Ed. 749 (1927), u.s. Constitution 14th Amendment, Idaho
Constitution Article I §13.
20
21
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13 th prior to the start trial. The motion was heard immediately prior to the commencement of
trial and denied.
In reviewing the denial of a motion to disqualify, the Court conducts a multi-tiered

inquiry to determine: (l) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3)
whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise ofreason. 26
Discretion: The district court did not state that he perceived the Issue as one of
discretion.
Boundaries of discretion consistent with legal standards: The district court did not
identify or address the legal standards applicable. Once a motion is filed with an
accompanying affidavit, the judge must pass on the legal sufficiency of the affidavit, not the
truth of the matters alleged. 27 If the affidavit shows the objectionable inclination or
disposition of the judge, it is his duty to proceed no further. 28 The demonstration of
"pervasive bias" must be derived from outside of events occurring at trial, and it must be "so
extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment.,,29 The district court did not
address the sufficiency of the affidavit. It never claimed the comments did not accurately
state his opinions against election contests and procedures. The denial of the motion was not
based upon any analysis. The district court chose to brush them aside by asserting that that
they were made in a "proceeding that...has absolutely nothing to do with this case. So that's

Blancv. State, 36294, 36295 (IDCCA); Statev. Hedger, J15 Idaho 598,600, 768 P. 2d 1331,1333 (1989)
Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 41 S. Ct. 230, 65 L. Ed. 481 (1921).
28 Bergerv. United States, 255 U.s. 22, 35, 41 S. Ct. 230, 65 L. Ed. 481 (1921).
29 Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 752, 250 P. 3d 803 (Idaho App. 2011) citing Bach v.
Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 229 P. 3d 1146 (2010).
26

27
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how I can proceed.,,3o The district court's denial of the motion to disqualify made from the
bench failed to identify any standards and didn't deny that the court held the opinions. The
bias or prejudice of the district court is set forth in the transcript of the contempt hearings. 3!
The comments beginning on page 30 of the September i

h

hearing transcript are:

On the other hand, the Court has a concern in this litigation about
the rights of the citizen voters. This type of litigation which may be and no
doubt is and should be important in litigants has a ramification upon the
average voter that in the view of this court is not a salutary connotation.
And there's been arguments even made in open court that because this is an
election case, a court should exercise extraordinary powers never used in
civil litigation before in the history of American jurisprudence and haul
citizens back at their own cost into court for a hearing for trial because they
voted. That's very disturbing to this court. The wisdom of the American
democracy is not delivered by the fiercely partisan voting. The wisdom of
the American democracy is delivered by the average citizen that goes down
to the voting place on the day of the election and votes as they see best to
serve their commUfIity and does so out of public duty. Not because they have
some crusade or some test point that they want to prove, but because they
want to see their community work. To have litigation, publishing voters'
names, calling in whether their affidavits are correct, whether they're legal or
illegal, whether they can be hauled into court, grilled by a judge with regard
to their votes, is an anathema to everything about our democratic process. So
the secrecy, the confidentiality, the privacy of the voter is of paramount
concern to the Court, and some apparent disregard of those issues by
litigants or participants is of concern to this court.
The elements of democratic elections are concisely set forth in the U.S. Department of
State Publication, USA Democracy in Brief (2008):
"Democratic Elections ...
Whatever the exact system, election processes must be seen as fair...and, if necessary,
institute procedures for...resolving election disputes."
The on the record comments are pervasive as the derogatory comments made by Judge
Landis in Berger v. United States 32 regarding Germans. J. Hosack's comments were directed

30 Tr. p. 31, 1. 18-20. Additionally, as will be shown below, 1. Hosack's statements have everything to do with
his rulings and decision in this case.
31 R. p. 2083.
32 Bergerv. United States, 41 S. Ct. 230, 255 Us. 22 (1921)
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at this election contest and reflect that he viewed it as "an anathema" to our democratic form
of government.
A decision by an exercise of reason: The district court failed to make any effort to
disavow his expressed views. It asserted Brannon's counsel had a "misunderstanding,,33, the
comments were focused on a proceeding that had "nothing to do with this trial34 , and that
Brannon's counsel must have some "emotional baggage involved.,,35 No ruling on the
sufficiency of the affidavit was made. Consistent with its earlier expressed perspective that
"it's more important to make a prompt decision, frankly, than the right one,,,36 the goal to
bring the perceived anathema to the election process to an end, the district court paid no heed
to his responsibility to step aside, and moved on to the trial and his preordained outcome.
The district court's comments exposed its deeply held bias and prejudice towards
election contests to be of such an extreme nature that they rendered him unable to render a
fair judgment. The hearing transcript of the judge's biased and prejudicial view was filed
with the disqualifYing affidavit37 . An anathema is something that is cursed, damned, greatly
reviled, loathed, or shunned?8 A judge holding such a deeply held conviction could not be
impartial. Denial of the motion to disqualify deprived Brannon of his fundamental due
process right to a fair and impartial judge. All action taken after the filing of the affidavit,
including the judgment, are void. 39
ARGUMENT
2. The district court erred in holding that non-city residents are
33 Tr. p. 26, 1. 10-15.
34Tr.p.31,p.16-18.
35 Tr. p. 29,24-25.
36 June 14,2010 Hearing Tr. p. 35, 1. 12-13.
37 R. p. 2089.
38 R. p. 2060.
39 Lewiston Lime Co. v. Barney, 87 Idaho 462,394 P. 2d 323 (1964).

APPELLANT BRANNON'S OPENING BRlEF

8

entitled to have their votes counted in the municipal election
based upon the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee
Voting Act 42 U.S.C. 1973ff et seg.(UOCAVA).

This presents a question of statutory interpretation over which the Court exercises free
review. 4o Brannon challenged the error that occurred when

absentee ballots were sent,

received, and even forwarded to non-city residents who had not even applied for them and to
non-city residents not in the "United States service." The district court concluded that these
non-city residents of the City were "Qualified Electors,,41 entitled to vote in the
Municipality's 2009 General Election.42 The district court acknowledged that, what it
referred to as "the issue of UOCA VA votes," relates to alleged irregularities in the election
process. 43 This "UOCAVA" issue impacts I.C. § 34-2001
the result,

ill malconduct sufficient to change

ill illegal votes received sufficient to change the result, and ® error in counting

votes.
At least five (5) non-city resident and non-United States service absentee ballot voters
(Paquin, Farkes, Friend, Dobslaft4 and Gagnon) received absentee ballots that were counted
in the election. The district court held the Seat 2 race was decided by 3 votes without
deducting these non-city resident votes. These five (5) absentee ballot votes are sufficient to
change the result of the election. It was established that none of the five (5) absentee voters
resided in the City, none lived at the address which they claimed on their respective

State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326,208 P. 3d 730 (2009); Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho
388, 11 I P. 3d 73 (2005)
41 I.e. § 50-402 (c).
42 The most cogent examples of the district court's reasoning are set forth at Tr. p. 877-881 and the
Memorandum Decision, R. p. 2279, 2282-2284.
43 R. 2282.
44 The district court only addressed four (4) in his memorandum decision. It ruled in open court on Dobslaff
40
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registration cards as their "residence," and none of them could be found within Kootenai
County for service of a subpoena on them. 45
Of these five (5) non-resident absentee ballot voters only Gagnon had ever been in the
United States service. At the time she received and she returned her absentee ballot she was
not in the United States service. Additionally, Gagnon had never resided in the City. Her
mother-in-law testified Gagnon's address was in Petaluma, California and that Gagnon had
never resided in the City.46 Gagnon's only connection to the City was that she was married to
a person in the U.S. Coast Guard. 47
Even if UOCA VA applied to municipal elections under the Idaho Municipal Election
Laws, Gagnon would not be entitled to vote in an election in city of her "in service"
husband's residence. No person obtains voting "residency" based solely on the fact of the
marriage. Beard wasn't aware whether or not a husband and wife, depending upon where
they had previously actually resided, would have different residences for voting purposes. 48
Under UOCA VA a person must be able to establish that prior to being in the "United States
service," the person was a resident of the municipality for at least thirty (30) days.49 The
instructions for submitting a Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot, Standard Form 186 A (Rev.
10-2005) require that the applicable residence address is that of the absentee ballot applicant

where the person "ACTUALLY LIVED" previously.
UOCA VA has never applied to municipal elections in Idaho. The Idaho Municipal
Election Laws only provide for persons who are in the "United States service" as provided

R. p. 1827-1841
Tr. p. 720-721, 1. 1-2.
47 Tr. p. 721, 1. 3-25.
48 Tr. p. 821,1. 2-7.
49 I.e. § 50-402 (c)
45
46
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for in the "Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955." (FVAA 1955) I.C. § 50-443 is specific
in this regard. After FV AA 1955 was repealed in 1986, the Idaho legislature did not amend
I.C. § 50-443. For county and state elections the Idaho legislature amended I.C. § 34-41OA.
When the legislature amends a statute, the Court assumes that it knows of existing precedent
and intends for it to have a different meaning from the meaning accorded the statute before
amendment. so City election residency requirements are different than residency requirements
for federal, state, county elections.
With the federal repeal of FV AA 1955 and the enactment of UOCA VA, to the extent it
did not change the provisions of FVAA 1955, it is construed as remaining in force? Only
the FVAA 1955 provisions pertaining to persons in the "United States service" continued in
force.
The district court acknowledged that the residency requirements of the Idaho
Municipal Elections Laws are different than the state and county residence requirements.
"The municipal statute is slightly different from the residence of-under
the state law."s2
The Chief Deputy for the Secretary of State's Office, Mr. Hurst, confirmed that the Idaho
Municipal Election Laws are different than the county and state for determining residency.
"Q. So just because a person is a resident for county voting purposes
or state purposes or national purposes, if they're not a resident
of the City of Coeur d' Alene, they don't qualify under that
statute (I.C. § 50-443) do they?"
A. Under the statute, no. S3

Stewart v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, 138 Idaho 509, 512, 65 P. 3d 531, 534 (2003).
See State v. Nichols, 110 Idaho 823, 718 P. 2d 1261, 1265 (Idaho App. 1986; Ellenwoodv. Cramer, 751daho
338,272 P. 2d 702, 706 (1954); Staffordv. Kootenai County, 37320-2010 (IDSCC1), April 20, 2011.
52 Tr. p. 878, 1. 23-25.
53 Tr. p. 455, 1. 20-25.
50

51
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English, the County Clerk, testified he thought that UOCAVA are military voters,
spouses of military voters, missionaries, or embassy workers. 54 Beard thought anyone living
outside the United States was a qualified City voter just because they filed a "UOCA VA"
form. If a UOCA VA form is received from a non-city resident absentee ballot applicant, the
investigation into a person's residency "wouldn't have-have went any further."ss Beard
testified that, despite her "reliance" on UOCA VA, she never said that she was aware of the
federal election laws. 56
The district court acknowledged that "the language is there that would allow" a more
restrictive residency requirement. 57 The district court stated that it was "not comfortable
making the legal ruling" that when a person under federal law can vote for president that the
person cannot vote in a municipal election. 58 This represents a fundamental misapplication of
the municipal statute and of the important differences between the "political community"
used by legislatures to determine who is entitled to vote in various elections. The applicable
"political community" is different for federal, state, county, and city elections. The district
court, even after receiving live testimony from Dobslaff over the internet, via Skype, held
that Dobslaff was a city resident for the purpose of the City's election. Examples of non-city
residents the district court held were entitled to have their vote counted in the municipal
election are:
1. Dobslaff has been a permanent resident ("landed immigrant") of Canada since
1988. In order to maintain this status she can only leave Canada for a total of three

Tr.
Tr.
56 Tr.
57 Tr.
58 Tr.
54
55

p. 155, I. 13-18.
p. 812, 1. 15-19.
p. 821,1. 8-13.
p. 879, 1. 18-21
p. 880, 1. 10-17.
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2.

3.

4.

5.

months in any give five (5) year period of time. Her primary home or place of
abode, since 1988, is Vemon, British Columbia. 59
Gagnon is not in the United States service and never resided in the City.60
Paquin had not resided in City for at least two (2) years. She has resided in, and
works in, Montreal, Canada. 6l
Farkes had not resided at the residence claimed on her registration card for at least
five (5) years. She represented as being unknown to the persons residing at that
address. 62
Friend resides in Nelson, British Columbia, 63 and he had not lived at the
commercial address on his registration card for at least five (5) years 64

The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that by statute states:
1. Have the power to require voters be bona fide residents of the relevant political
subdivision. 65
2. May define residence to preserve the basic conception of a political community. 66
Idaho's Municipal Election Laws restrict a person's right to vote by:
Requirin~ a person to be a resident for at least 30 days next preceding the
election. 7
2. Requiring that before an absentee ballot is sent out that:
a. The person have a registration card on file; and
b. The person is lawfully entitled to vote in the pending election. 68

1.

The county's election supervisor, Beard, testified no

investigation was undertaken into

whether a person filing a UOCA V A form was "lawfully entitled to vote" as required by
statute, regardless of how many years had passed since the registration card was filed. 69 The
residences for Dobslaff, and Friend,70 who didn't request absentee ballots for the election,
were automatically "presumed" to be the addresses on the registration card7l and they were

Tr. p. 857-877.
Tr. p. 720-721.
61 R. p. 1830-1831.
62 R. p. 1833-1834
63 R. p. 1554.
64 R. p. 1836-1837.
65 Dunn v. Blumstein. 405 Us. 330 (1972)
66 Id., p. 343-344
67 I. C. § 50-402.
68 I.e. § 50-445.
69 Tr. p. 634, 1. 21-25, p. 635, 1. 1-14.
70 Tr. p. 647,1. 5-14.
71 Tr. p. 633, I. 11-17.
59
60
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automatically sent absentee ballots. Beard asserted that the elections office was not the
"election police,,,n and in ridicule of the requirement to verify that a person was "lawfully
entitled to vote," testified that she did not conduct "bed checks.,,73
The U.S. Supreme Court explained how quickly and easily a voter's bona fide
residence can be determined:
" ... the job of detecting nonresidents from among persons who have
registered is a relatively simple one ... Objective evidence tendered
as relevant to the question of bona fide residence under Tennessee
law-places of dwelling, occupation, car registration, driver's license
property owned, etc. is easy to double check, especially in
light of modem communications." 74
Idaho Municipal Election Law, I.C. § 50-402 (d) (1), requires that similar information be
investigated in order to determine whether a person is "lawfully entitled to vote."
Counting the absentee ballots of these five (5) non-city resident persons because they
filed a UOCA V A form resulted in error sufficient enough to change the outcome of the race
regarding Seat 2 that was decided by three (3) votes.

ARGUMENT
3. The district court erred in refusing to order the non-city
residents who returned absentee ballots to testify as to
their residence and for whom they cast their vote.
The question of the existence of personal jurisdiction is a question of law which the
Court reviews freely. 75 The Court exercises free review over matters of statutory
•

•

mterpretatIOn.

76

Tr. p. 639, 1. 3-8.
Tr.p. 691, 4-9.
74 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 u.s. 330, 348.
75 Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 152 P. 3d 594 (2007).
76 State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326,208 P. 3d 730 (2009); Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho
388, 111 P. 3d 73 (2005)
72
73
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Brannon initiated contacts with five persons (Paquin, Friend, Farkes, Dobslaff, and
Gagnon) whose absentee ballots were counted in the election but whose residences were
not in the City. Only Paquin, Dobslaff and Gagnon even initially responded questions from
Brannon as to their residence. The contacts with Paquin and Gagnon ceased completely.
Dobslaff finally agreed to testify over the internet via Skype 77 from her home in Vernon,
British Columbia.
Kennedy's attorney (Reed) interfered and prevented all communications with non-city
resident absentee ballot voter Paquin who was living in Montreal, Canada. Paquin, after
agreeing to sign an affidavit and confirming she voted for Kennedy, changed her mind and
advised Brannon's attorney bye-mail:
"If you need to contact me again Scott Reed (Mike's attorney) has my
home email address and phone number.,,78
Despite numerous written requests Reed refused to provide Brannon's counsel with Paquin's
contact information. Paquin without question cast her absentee ballot vote for Kennedy.79
It was also established that Reed had conversations with Farkes regarding her having

voted in the City election by absentee ballot. Reed advised both Paquin and Farkes that "an
Idaho court could not compel a person in Canada to appear as a witness in at trial.,,8o
Brannon moved the district court to issue an order compelling Paquin, Dobslaff,
Farkes, Friend, and Gagnon to testify in order to establish they were residents of the City.81
Each of these persons, who voted by absentee ballot, were not capable of being served with
subpoena in Kootenai County to compel their attendance. All of them were residing outside

Tr. p. 854
R. p. 596-597.
R. p. 599.
80 R. p. 1695.
81 R. p. 1554-1555.
77

78
79
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of the State of Idaho. 82 The election contest statutes provide the mechanism to compel the
testimony of non-resident voters.
Election contest procedures are intended to ensure that only city residents vote.
"34-2013. Procedure in general.-The procedure shall be held
according to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure so far as
practicable, but shall be under the control and direction of the
court, which shall have all the powers necessary to the right
hearing and determination of the matter; to compel attendance
ofwitnesses ... to punish for contempt in its presence or by
disobedience to its lawful mandate ... "
"34-2017. Voters to testify as to qualifications.-(a) The court may
require any person called as a witness, who voted at such election,
to answer touching his qualifications as a voter; ... "
The district court denied the request to issue the orders. 83 It felt that the election contest was
"civil litigation." 84 It limited itself to the rules of civil procedure and refused to consider the
specific election contest provisions authorizing the issuance of these orders. The district court
stated that it believed that Brannon's counsel was asking the court to assist "in the business of
recruiting and providing witnesses" and "to devise a different rule for elections.,,85 The
district court held "there's no legal basis,,86 for it to exercise power never heard of in the
history of American jurisprudence. 87
Idaho law is well established that a determination of whether or not a court should
exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, outside the boundaries of its subpoena power, is
dependent upon an analysis of the specific facts under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. and
Idaho constitutions. 88

82

R. 1827-184l.

Ths request was the subject of the district court's comments when it revealed it's bias and prejudice.
August 31,2010 Hearing Tr. p. 51, I. 6-7.
85 August 31,2010 Hearing Tr. p. 51, I. 11-18.
86 August 31, 2010 Hearing Tr. p. 52, I. 5.
8] R. p. 2118.
88 Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLe, 143 Idaho 723, 152 P. 3d 594 (2007).
83

84
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The two types of personal jurisdiction are "general" and "specific." For an individual
the "paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's domicile."s9
Each of the five (5) UOCAVA voters claimed City residency and the right to vote.
With regard to all of these absentee ballot voters (Paquin, Farkes, Friend, Gagnon, and
Dobslaff) Brannon presented the court with affidavits establishing the inability to serve these
persons with subpoenas.
The "specific" personal jurisdiction question over these persons depends on whether
each respective person's involvement the suit "arises out of or relates to the person's contacts
with the state.,,90 If a person purposely avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities
in a state, and thus invoking the benefits of its laws, that person is subject to the jurisdiction
of the state COurtS. 91 By voting in City's election claiming to be residents of the City, each of
these persons SUbjected themselves to the jurisdiction of the district court in the election
contest.
Once a person takes a specific act, such as voting, he submits to the jurisdiction of the
court, and it becomes a question of "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.,,92
The purity of elections in this country has always been seen as being of vital importance upon
which hangs the "experiment of self-government.,,93 If a state has a significant interest in
redressing injuries that occur within the state under a state's long-arm statute, it certainly has
a significant interest in the conduct and fairness of its elections.

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, _U.S._J31 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
see fu 250.
91 Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. State of Wash. 123 Idaho 739, 852 P. 2d 491 (1993)
92 McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, _U.s.---1 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
93 A Treatise on the American Law of Elections, George W. McCrary, 1875, see R. p. 1593
89

90
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Idaho's long-arm statute is co-extensive with all of the jurisdiction available to this
state under the due process clause of the United States Constitution. 94 The long arm statute
specifically applies to the ownership, use or possession of any real property in this state. It
provides a convenient analogy consistent with due process. In order to be a qualified elector
in a municipality a person must be a resident of the municipality. Municipal residency
requires a person's principal or primary home or place of abode in which a person's
habitation is fixed to be in the city.95 This requirement is no different than the "use or
possession" of real property. A subpoena, unable to be served, subjects the person to no
penalty for failure to testify and establish their residence and "lawful entitlement to vote.,,96
The issuance of an order that could be served on a person residing outside of Idaho would
compel the person's presence upon penalty of contempt.
All citizens of the City have an interest in adjUdicating whether the election was held
properly under the law and only legal ballots from voters residing in the City were counted.
The United States and Idaho constitutional due process provisions require that an analysis of
the burden on the absentee voter be a consideration, too. 97 As the U.S. Supreme Court noted
as early as 1958, the progress in communications and transportation has made the exercise of
jurisdiction over non-residents less burdensome.
There is no reason to believe that Paquin, Gagnon, Farkes, and Friend would not have
responded appropriately to the order and not been able to testify through the internet on
Skype just as Do bslaff testified.

Knutsen v. Cloud, 142 Idaho 148, 124 P. 3d 1024 (2005).
I. C. § 50-402 (d) (1).
96 Tr. p. 46, 1. 7-15.
97 Smallyv. Kaiser, 1301daho909, 950P. 2d 1284 (1997).
94

95
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The cavalier, "who cares," attitude of the non-city resident absentee voters in this
election underscores the necessity of a court to order that they testify.

Paquin, whose

conduct was likely the result of the advice that Kennedy's attorney gave her that an Idaho
court had no authority over her, is illustrative. She "paraded about", with the encouragement
of the Spokane newspaper blog, challenging the very concept of "residency" requirements for
voting in a city election. She proclaimed it was "ridiculous" for Brannon to question her
residency in such a election:

Canada Voter: Brannon Suit Silly

Monica Paquin, a former resident of Coeur d'Alene now living in the Montreal area.. And
all she did was send her absentee ballot back after voting for long-time friend Mike
Kennedy .... She was told by Kootenai County officials that she could vote in her last place
of residence in the United States as long as she didn't vote elsewhere. Monica, who works
for a Washington company, is classified as a "permanent resident' in Canada, and has no
idea when she will return to the United States ... she ... considers Brannon's effort to
overthrow a local election "ridiculous. ,,98
The district court's refusal to order them to testify precluded Brannon from challenging their
residency and right to vote. This violated Brannon's due process rights under the U.S. and
Idaho Constitutions. 99
Kennedy's attorney Reed's argument against Issmng the order reinforces the
foundation of Brannon's argument:
"It is hardly surprising that the out-of-state residents after initially
replying to questions from a private investigator, decided that they
did not want to become involved in a city council election of no
importance to them ... "IOO

The district court acknowledged the impact of his refusal by noting that regardless
whether or not he correctly applied UOCAVA, it didn't matter:
"there's no indication as to how they voted .. .Ifyou don't have any
of them testify, you haven't proved anything."IOI
R. p. 598.
U.S. Constitution 14th Amendment, Article I § 13 Idaho Constitution
100 R. p. 2002.

98

99
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of

"Even if all were found to be illegal residents, because there is no
evidence of how they voted, any illegality of their residence cannot
impact the outcome of the election and is therefore irrelevant.,,102
The district court erred determining Dobslaff to be a "resident" of the City and not allowing
Brannon to establish for whom she voted in the Seat 2 race. The district court erred in not
issuing its order compelling the other four (4) non-city residents to testify and finding
Dobslaff was a City resident entitled to vote. In the Seat 2 race these five (5) votes were
sufficient to change the result of the election

ARGUMENT

4. The district court erred in dismissing the claim of malconduct,
refusing to permit the complaint to be subsequently amended to
assert a claim of malconduct, and holding that there was
insufficient evidence in the record to find malconduct.
The Court exercises free review over matters of statutory interpretation. 103 When the
district court dismissed all claims against the City and City Clerk, the malconduct claim was
dismissed but not addressed. 104 The district court (J. Hosack) granted the motion to rejoin the
City and City Clerk. The district court labeled the statutory malconduct claim as nothing
more than "inflammatory rhetoric.,,105 Consistent with its prejudice and bias against election
contests, it simply did not want malconduct addressed at trial.

At trial the motion was

renewed, but it was denied in the memorandum decision. The basis of the denial is narrow.
"This Court has denied the motion to amend on the grounds the County
was not a party." I 06
Idaho's Municipal Election Laws in effect in 2009 require that:
1. The City Clerk is the chief elections officer and shall exercise the
December 7, 2010, Hearing Tr. p. 81, I. 16-25.
R. p. 2262.
103 State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326,208 P. 3d 730 (2009); Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, I4I Idaho
388, III P. 3d 73 (2005)
104 March 2, 2010 Hearing Tr. p. 63, I. 24-25, p. 64, I. 1-2.
105 August 31, 2010 Hearing Tr. p. 31, I. 17~8.
106 R. p. 2296.
101

102
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administration of the election laws in his city for the purpose of
achieving and maintaining a maximum degree of correctness,
impartiality, efficiency and uniformity. !07
3. The City Clerk shall issue instructions to ensure uniformity in the
application, operation and interpretation of the election laws during
the election.!OS
4. Any person adversely affected by any act or failure to act by the city
clerk under any election law or by an order, rule, regulation, directive
or instruction made under authority of the city clerk under any election
law may appeal to the district court. 109
The election laws in effect in 2009 authorize a City Clerk only to "employ such persons ... he
considers necessary to facilitate and assist his carrying out his functions in connection with
administration of the election laws.!10 Even if some of the City's contract with the County
(Defendants' Exhibit B) can be held to fall within this grant of authority, the employed
person cannot totally assume all the City Clerk's statutory election responsibilities.
The district court erred by holding the County was an "independent contractor" and thus
the City and City Clerk were totally absolved of any election responsibility. The City and
City Clerk have defined statutory responsibilities. This is acknowledged in the contract. The
City had the right to "specify the time and place of performance, and the results to be
achieved." It remained the City and Clerk's responsibility to ensure compliance with Idaho
Municipal Election Laws. Additionally, under the contract the County agreed to indemnify
the City against any action "arising out of or in connection with the acts and/or performance
or activities."!!! Without responsibility, that provision was not necessary. Even in the private
sector setting the district court decision constitutes error. The Court's holding in Baily v.

I.C. § 50-403.
I.C. § 50-403.
109 I.e. § 50-406.
110 I.e. § 50-404.
111 Defendants' Exhibit B, p. 3, paragraph 5.
107

108
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Ness 112 is contrary to the holding of the district court. A principal is responsible for an agent's

wrongful acts, "so long as the agent has acted within the course and scope of authority
delegated by the principal." Express authority and implied authority are forms of actual
authority. Express authority is that authority which the principal has explicitly granted the
agent to act in the principal's name. Implied authority refers to the authority necessary, usual,
and proper to accomplish or perform the express authority delegated to the agent by the
principal. The contract intended to grant the County the authority to act in the City's name.
The contract was what provided the County the authority necessary to conduct the City's
election.
There is no statutory rule of construction that would lead to a conclusion that the City
and City Clerk did not have the responsibility to ensure the election was in compliance with
the Idaho Municipal Election Laws. The 2009 Idaho Municipal Election Laws require that the
mayor and council shall canvass the results of the election. l13 There is no statutory rule of
construction that supports an interpretation of this statute that anyone else may canvass the
election for the mayor and council.
J. Simpson's dismissal of the City made the malconduct claim a victim of the
erroroneous dismissal. J. Hosack's refusal to permit the malconduct claim when he reinstated
the City and City Clerk into the election contest was based on an erroneous standard that
"even if it is alleged, it isn't sufficient to change the result in any way other than the illegal

112

Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 708 P. 2d 900 (1985).

113

I.e. § 50-467.
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votes.,,114 The district court's decision held that even if the County were a party, the
irregularities alleged in the proposed amended complaint fail to state a malconduct claim. I IS
The memorandum decision asserted that the "proposed amended complaint" has
nothing to do with Brannon's motion during trial. However the district court was no longer
dealing with allegations. It was evaluating evidence in the record. The issue before the district
court was whether the issue of malconduct had been tried. I 16 The district court did hold that
there was insufficient evidence in the record to establish malconduct, but its decision was
founded upon its interpretation that "proof of fraud or corruption" was required to establish
malconduct. I 17 Under its analysis that "the only thing that the city did was receive what the
county did and said we got this from the county," I 18 and since "the city is not vicariously
liable," I 19 there was no evidence in the record upon which it could find malconduct because
the County conducted the election.
Substantial competent evidence of the County's malconduct sufficient to change the
election result was introduced. While the statute does not define malconduct, as early as
1890 it was recognized that conduct resulting in unfair elections which permit illegal votes to
be cast and counted are within the statutory provisionsYo Chamberlain v. Woodin

121

did not

limit what constituted malconduct. In 1899, in Ball v. Campbell, 122 the Court stated "Should a
judge of election, after his attention has been called to an infraction of the law, refuse or
neglect to proceed at once against the derelict, then, indeed, might there be some ground for
May 14, 20lO Hearing Tr. p. 47, I. lO-18, p. 48,1. 16-19.
R. p. 2296-2297.
116 Noble v. Ada County Elections. Bd, 135 Idaho 495, 20 P. 3d 679 (ldaho2000).
II? R. p. 2294.
118 August 31, 20lO Hearing Tr. p.39, I. 13-15.
119 August 31, 20lO Hearing Tr. p. 40, I. 23.
120 Chamberlain v. Woodin, 2 Idaho 642,23 P. 177 (1890).
121 Chamberlain v. Woodin, 2 Idaho 642,23 P. 177 (1890).
122 Ball v. Campbell, 6 Idaho 754, 59 P. 559 (Idaho 1899).
114
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charging him with malconduct." In 1917, in Huffaker v. Edgingtion,123 the Court required
that irregularities in the conduct of the election "cast serious doubts upon the results of the
election." In Noble v. Ada County Elections Bd 124 the Court held that failure "to follow every
election procedure precisely, without more, is insufficient."
That Idaho courts have grappled with defining malconduct is no surprise. Just as every
election race is different, so too are the types of, and degree and extent of, the failures to
comply with statutorily mandated procedures that may occur in the process. Justice Potter
Stewart's comment that "I know it when I see it,,125 is perhaps as precise as a "definition" that
can be attached to "malconduct" in the statute. The dynamics of an election require the
determination of malconduct to be made on a case by case basis. The Idaho legislature,
despite the ongoing struggle in election contests to define malconduct, has chosen to not
define it even in the laws effective in 2011.
Failure to follow Idaho's Municipal Election Laws was rampant in the 2009 City
General Election. Some failures were more egregious than others. Some failures were
sufficient to change the result for Seat 2. Collectively the failures represent an election run in
total disregard of the Idaho Municipal Election Laws and an outcome, at least regarding Seat
2, that could not be verified.
This total collapse of the election process could be attributed to the City's wholesale
delegation of its statutory election duties to the County. The testimony of the County Clerk,
English, painfully revealed that he personally had little knowledge of the Idaho Municipal
Election Laws and no practical understanding of how a City election is required to be

Huffakerv. Edgingtion, 30 Jdaho 179,163 (Idaho 1917).
Noble v. Ada County Elections Bd, 135 Idaho 495, 20 P. 3d 679 (Jdaho 2000).
125 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 Us. 184.84 S.Ct. 1676. 12 L. Ed 2d 793 (1964).
123

124
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conducted under them. His elections office supervisor, Beard, testified that Title 34, not Title
50 chapter 4 Municipal Election Laws, governed City elections. 126
The following are examples of failures to follow laws sufficient to change the election
result.
FAILURE TO VERIFY RESIDENCY
I.C. § 50-443 requires, before any person is provided an absentee ballot, the Clerk
must first verify that the person is (1) registered and then (2) lawfully entitled to vote. This
two-step evaluation must be completed before a person can be found to be entitled to receive
an absentee ballot.
Despite the fact that residency requirements for city elections are different from county
or state elections,l27 the registration cards used for the City election did not require the person
affirm they were a resident of the City. They only required that the person affirm they were a
resident of a respective county or the state. 128
The County did not conduct any investigation into whether a person, with a registration
card was "lawfully entitled to vote." The only investigation consisted of entering the name
into the statewide database to see ifthere was a registration card. 129 This is the same database
that Beard later asserted was not accurate. 130 If the database revealed any registration card,
even one ten (l0) years old, Beard made the determination, on her own, that the person was
"lawfully entitled to vote,"
"Q. What does your office do then to determine lawfully entitled to vote?

Tr.
Tr.
128 Tr.
129 Tr.
130 Tr.
126
127

p.
p.
p.
p.
p.

615, 1. 1-9; Plaintiffs Exhibit 101, p. 5.
454,1. 16-25; p. 455, 1. 20-23; p. 456, 1. 4-8.
456,1. 19-25; p. 457,1. 1-2.
657, I. 23-25, p. 658, 1. 1-4.
698, I. 16-22; p.668, 1. 8-16.
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A. Well, the registration card would make them eligible to vote.,,13i

According to Beard,

"Q .... other than looking at the registration card ... you don't make any
further investigation into where a person's residence is 30 days prior to
the election?
A. NO.,,132
Timothy Hurst, Chief Deputy for the Secretary of State's Office, testified:
"Q. To be a resident lawfully entitled to vote in a municipal election
you just testified you have to be a resident of the city for 30 days
prior to the election, correct?
A. That's right.
Q. SO just because a person is a resident for county voting purposes or state purposes
or national purposes, if they're not a resident of the City of
Coeur d' Alene, they don't qualify under that statute, do they?
A. Under the statute, no.,,133
I.C. § 50-443 requires a person to "make application" for an absentee ballot to vote in
an approaching election. In the 2009 City election absentee ballots were automatically sent to
anyone who had previously applied for an absentee ballot in a state or federal election. The
persons sending out absentee ballots didn't even wait for a person to apply for an absentee
ballot for the 2009 election. A previous absentee ballot application submitted by any non-city
resident was just copied and a 2009 City absentee ballot automatically sent to them. 134

1. C. § 50-443 specifically references the "Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955" and
provides that persons" in the United States service may apply for an absent elector's ballot.
This statute has never been amended. However, a different federal law, the Uniformed and
Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)135 that is more expansive for federal

Tr. p. 648, 1. 10-13.
Tr. p. 657, 1. 23-25, p. 658, I. 1-4.
133 Tr. p. 455, I. 20-25, p. 1-8.
134 Tr. p. 645, 646, 647. Examples, Paquin, Friend, and Dobs1aff)
135
42 U.S.C. section 1973 et seq.).
131
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elections was automatically used by Beard for the City election. Absentee ballots were sent to
persons who were not "in the United States service,,136 and even those who did not apply. 137
FAILURE TO KEEP ABSENTEE BALLOT RECORD
I.C. 50-451 requires that an absentee ballot record be kept and available to be examined
by the public. It provides:
The city clerk shall keep a record in his office containing a list of names and precinct
numbers of electors making applications for absent elector's [electors'] ballots,
together with the date on which such application was made, and the date on which such
absent elector's ballot was returned. If an absentee ballot is not returned or if it be
rejected and not counted, such fact shall be noted on the record. Such record shall be
open to public inspection under proper regulations."
Chief Deputy Secretary of State Timothy A. Hurst testified the "absentee ballot record"
serves three purposes in ensuring correctness of elections.
1. Make sure that people don't vote twice. 138
2. Validate that the number of absentee ballots that are tabulated match the number
of ballots that were received.
3, Compare the number of absentee ballots counted with the number received. 139
Hurst testified the failure to timely keep the absentee ballot record in the 2009 election was a
violation of the clerk's duty.

"Q. Do you have an opinion as the chief deputy for the Secretary of State's
office regarding elections as to whether or not it would be a failure of an
official's duty, the clerk, to keep those two records, 50-451 and 34_1011?140
A. Apparently not doing his duty ifhe doesn't keep them.,,141
Beard conceded that the "absentee ballot record" is required. 142 County Clerk English
testified no "absentee ballot record" was kept. English relied on the state's database. Beard
thought the required absentee ballot record was the state's database. 143 However when it was
established the database recorded that at least ten (10) fewer legal absentee ballots were
Examples are Paquin, Dobslaff, Friend, Farkes, and Gagnon.
Examples are Paquin and Dobslaff.
138 This actually occurred in this election. Tr. p. 210, I. 23-25, p. 211, I. 1-8.
139 Tr. p. 433, I. 25, p. 434, I. 1-15.
140 I.e. § 34-1011 pertains to a county election clerk's duty to maintain an "absentee ballot record".
141 Tr. p. 444, I. 5-11.
142 Tr. p. 667, I. 24-25, p. 668, I. 1-7.
143 Tr. p. 699, I. 3-8.
136

137
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returned than were counted, she claimed the database was inaccurate. 144 However there was
no testimony that the November 6,2009, absentee ballot record, Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, was not
accurate. The first absentee ballot record was first printed two (2) days after Beard had
already prepared the "District Canvass," and she never compared the two. The "absentee
ballot record" is Plaintiff's Exhibit 5. 145 English testified the November 6th "absentee ballot
record" documents all absentee ballots. He confirmed that the absentee ballot report
documents that a total of 2041 non-void absentee ballots were returned. 146 Beard admitted
she was aware of Plaintiff's Exhibit 5,147 but claimed the first time she saw it was during the
trial in this matter. 148 Apparently it wasn't a concern for her because Susan Smith, the
election clerk who prepared this "absentee ballot record", testified she "was sure that I told
my supervisor (Beard) that I had prepared this report,,,149 "on the same day,,150 she printed it.
Beard's election department computer was cleaned, and information that was on it was
represented to Brannon as being not available, so proving what records she had was not
possible.1 51 Beard acted as the only and self-appointed judge of the election. Nonetheless she
knowingly failed to keep an absentee ballot record, and she knowingly failed to compare the
machine count with that record, or any other record, before providing the tally to the City.
She prepared the "District Canvass," and she knew or should have known on November 6,
2009 that absentee ballot record documented that ten (10) fewer legal absentee ballots were
returned (2041) than were counted by machine (2051). Beard's knowing failure to compare
144 Tr. p. 698, 1. 16-22; p. 668, 1. 8-16. Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 was never called inaccurate. It was the "only"
evidence of the number of non-voided absentee ballots received.
145 Tr. p. 192,1. 4-9; Plaintiff's Exhibits p. 1, Exhibit 5
146 Tr. p. 193, 1. 22-25, p. 194, 1. 1.
147 Tr. p. 669, 1. 4-15.
148 Tr. p. 669, 1. 1-3.
149 Tr. p. 293, 1. 3-9.
150 Tr. p. 293, 1. 7-9.
151 Plaintiffs Exhibit 98.
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the machine tally with any record before giving the machine tally to the mayor and council
impacted the Seat 2 election in a manner sufficient to change the result.
The Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney was informed on November 16, 2009, the
absentee ballot record documented that fewer legal absentee ballots were received than were
counted. 152

On the same day a second "absentee ballot record" was printed. It also

documented more legal ballots were machine counted than were returned. 153 Beard could not
recall whether or not the Prosecutor contacted her about this question. 154 The Prosecutor
implied he contacted someone in the elections department. English testified he didn't know
details about the election process, and likely person contacted was Beard. The Prosecuting
Attorney told the person who informed him of the discrepancy, "I suggest you look at
Chapter 20 of Title 34. 155 Despite this e-mail record, the Prosecutor testified he "just didn't
recall" if he contacted anyone. He couldn't recall if he spoke to English or his deputy
[Beard].156 The fact that Beard's computer was "cleaned" didn't raise any concerns for the
Prosecutor despite the ongoing election contest. 157
However apparently enough concerns were raised, because the County began an
attempt to locate anything that would substantiate the machine count of 2051 absentee
ballots. A third "absentee ballot record" was printed on November 24, 2009. This record
documented that 2043 non-voided absentee ballots were returned. Even this third absentee
ballot record documents that more ballots were counted than non-Voided absentee ballots
were returned.

Plaintiffs Exhibit 47.
Footnote 196 is also applicable here.
154 Tr. p. 669,1. 16-20.
155 Plaintiffs Exhibit 47.
156 Tr. p. 399, 16-25, p. 400, I. 1-20.
157 Tr. p. 419-421.
152
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Once it became clear a trial would not be prevented the County printed a fourth
absentee ballot record on August 19, 2010. 158 This record also didn't help the County
establish that the number of absentee ballots that were not "Voided" upon return, equaled the
number of ballots that were machine counted. It documented 2019 non-voided absentee
ballots as being returned. Phillips, testified that the record:
"identifies each and every absentee ballot request received by Kootenai County for
the November 3,2009 City of Coeur d' Alene General Election.,,159
Something had to be done to discredit the November 6, 2009 absentee ballot record," the only
evidence," that documented that 2041 non-voided absentee ballots were received. Somehow
the 2051 absentee ballots counted had to be accepted by the district court, thus testimony that
the database is dynamic, which means a person may be deleted by a clerk or county160
because voters may have changed their residence. 161 Hurst testified the database "isn't
necessarily accurate.,,162 The district court used this testimony to find that "relying on the
database system is not justified," because it is "known to be inaccurate.,,163 Whether or not
the database was unreliable has nothing to do with Hurst's testimony that Plaintiff's Exhibit
5, the November 6,2009 absentee ballot record, could only have been off by four (4) ballots,
so the maximum number of legal ballots that could have been received was 2045, not 2051.
Hurst searched the state's entire database to determine whether anybody who is not
documented in the November 6,2009 absentee ballot record as having returned an absentee
ballot might have had their name removed from the list. Hurst investigated all persons who
voted in the 2009 City election. Hurst testified that a total of four (4) voters had moved, and
Plaintiffs Exhibit 26.
Plaintiffs Exhibit 26, p. 2.
160 Tr. p. 698, I. 22-24.
161 Tr. p. 444, I. 20-24, p. 465, I. 12-24.
162 Tr. p. 444, I. 25, p. 445, I. 1-4.
163 Memorandum decision, R. p. 2290.
158

159
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their names had been removed. 164 He could not be determine whether these persons had voted
in person or by absentee ballot in the election. 165
Since the state's entire database documented only four (4) persons who voted in the
City election had moved their names removed since the election, Hurst testified that if it were
assumed that all four (4) of these persons voted by absentee ballot, the total number of
persons who returned legal absentee ballot in the City'S election was 2045. Thus the total
number of number of absentee ballots counted by machine (2051) was six (6) more than the
total number of legal (not "Voided,,166) absentee ballots (2045) that were received for the
election. 167 Despite acknowledging it was aware of the voided ballots 168 the district court
failed to deduct the 6 voided absentee ballots from the total of 2051 absentee ballots that it
found were returned. The correction of this calculation error establishes that the absentee
ballot tally given to the City was inaccurate by six (6) absentee ballots. Six (6) is sufficient to
change the result of the three (3) vote Brannon-Kennedy Seat 2 race.
Chief Deputy Hurst testified the only evidence as to the total number of non-voided
absentee ballots received for the election was 2041.

"Q .... what is the only evidence available as to the total number of
absentee ballots that were legally received on or before 8:00 p.m.
on November 3 rd , 2009?
A. The only evidence that I have seen is this ... Exhibit 5 169 ...
Q.... And that reflects 2042 170 , correct?
A. Yes.,,171

Tr. p.465, l. 25, p. 466, l. 21.
Tr. p. 466, I. 22-25, p. 467, I. 1.
166 Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, p. 178.
167 Tr. p. 467, l. 2-18.
168 R. p. 2289.
169 Tr. p. 442, I. 16-21
170 Which total is actually 2041 because as English testified, one voter had voted two absentee ballots, and one
was not declared void as it should have been.
171 Tr. p. 442, l. 24-25, p. 443, l. 1.
164

165
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The ballot counting machine's only function is to tabulate the number of ballots that
were run through it. 172 Despite the fact that more absentee ballots were counted than legal
(non-voided) absentee ballots were received, records that were claimed were kept such as the
daily absentee ballot logs and audit trails l73 were not offered into evidence to establish that
2051 legal (non-voided) absentee ballots were in fact received. The district court's finding
that "the County did in fact count 2051 valid absentee ballots sent in by 2051 absentee
voters,,174 is not supported by competent evidence. 175
FAILURE TO KEEP ANY SECONDARY ABSENTEE BALLOT RECORDS
Idaho Municipal Election Laws require back-up accounting records but none were
kept.
Poll Books.
An absentee ballot precinct was established by the County. It was precinct number
0073 CDA Absentee Precinct. 176 I.C. §§ 50-428 requires a poll book to be maintained for
each precinct. I.e. § 50-450 requires that upon receipt of an absentee ballot, it is to be
checked with the poll book and the absentee elector's name entered in the poll book as if he
had been present and voted. This was not done. If the numbers do not agree, the election
judges have to decide what to do. This was not done. The City Clerk did not even know if
there was a poll book for the absentee ballot precinct, and she didn't review any poll books.
Despite Beard's claim that an absentee precinct does not have poll book,177

I.C. § 50-465

requires that before counting any precinct's ballots, the number of ballots must equal the

Tr.P.664,L. 19-25,p. 665, 1. 1-3.
Tr. p. 698, 1. 8-12.
174 Memorandum Decision, R. p. 2292.
175 Noble v. Ada County Elections Ed 135 Idaho 495, 20 P. 3d 679 (2000).
176 Plaintiffs Exhibit 85.
177 Tr. p. 673, 1. 16.
172
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number of ballots in the poll book. If the number does not agree, the election judges are
supposed to decide what to do. This was not done. Beard didn't try to compare the number of
absentee ballots the machines counted to any report to verify that the total of legal absentee
ballots received equaled the number of absentee ballots counted. 178 Beard prepared the
"District Canvass" from the machine printout without comparing that number with any record
to verify that the machine count number equaled the number of legal absentee ballots
returned.
Even when poll books were kept, they failed to identify what ballot a person was given.
Fifty three (53) persons are recorded in poll books as casting votes, but there is no record of
whether they were given City, County, or Fernan ballots. It is undisputed that at least one
known person, County resident Zellars,179 was given a City ballot that was illegally counted.
Fernan resident Chadderdon was erroneously given a City ballot. She had to correct the poll
worker and get the correct ballot before voting. 180 With no poll record identifying which
ballot these fifty three (53) voters received it can't be established what ballot they received,
and voted. Given that two (2) voters received the wrong ballots and with no way to establish
which ballot 53 other voters received and voted, there is no way to prove these persons voted
on the proper ballot. If just three (3) received and voted incorrect ballots, it would be
sufficient to change the election results.
Canvass by mayor and council-the last ditch safeguard
The Idaho Municipal Election Laws mandate the City Council has specific duties to
perform. I.C. § 50-467. Canvassing votes-Determining results of election.

178
179
180

Tr. p. 666, 1. 8-10.
Tr. p. 784.
Tr. p. 659-660.
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"The mayor and the city council, within six (6) days following any election,
shall meet for the purpose of canvassing the results of the election."
One of the alleged grounds of contest of an election is for "any error in any board of
canvassers in counting votes" sufficient to change the result of the election. 181 The mayor
and council failed to perform any count of votes. No canvass occurred.
The City Clerk testified that she had no part in the preparation of the "District
Canvass." 182

The mayor and council literally did nothing more than accept the tally

presented by the County. No questions were asked. 183 The City Clerk testified:
"A. That's what a canvass of votes is is accepting the tabulation of an
election. And that's what the council did.,,184
"A. The County does not do a canvass. The County tabulates the votes.
The council does the canvass by their motion of accepting their tabulation
of votes. That's a canvass.,,185
"A .. They're [the County] the ones that count them.,,186

Municipality's attorney, Gridley, confirmed that no count of votes was made by the mayor
and council. The counting of the votes was "delegated to the county.,,187
The City Clerk testified that she prepared canvass meeting minutes. 188 They do not
document that councilman Bruning, whom the minutes reflect seconded the motion, was even
present at the meeting. City attorney Gridley, testified that he did not know who seconded the
County canvass acceptance motion. 189 Municipality's trial attorney Haman represented that
the vote numbers are prepared by the county and presented to the council as a mere formality,
a 'rubber stamp' of the County's information.

I.e. § 34-2001 (6).
Plaintiffs Exhibit 85.
183 Tr. p. 99, I. 15-23, Plaintiffs Exhibit 86, R. p. 24l.
184 Tr. p. 99, I. 21-23.
185 Tr. p. 101, I. 14-17.
186 Tr. p. 103, 1. 2.
187 Tr. p. 565, 1. 18-25.
188 Plaintiffs Exhibit 87, R. p. 242,
189 Tr. p. 562, I. 14-18,
181
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"Mr. Haman: (City's trial attorney) It's a formality that whenever there is an
election, the County, in this instance, tallied up the results, came to an
official, sent it to-under the statute, you've got six days-the County has
six days to tally it up, basically, make it final, give it to what is called a
Board of Canvass, or canvass the election, the City accepts it. In fact, it's a
rubber stamp.,,190 (emphasis added)
If the mayor and council had not failed to perform their duty and had actually conducted the
canvass required, all ballot issues including the number of legal absentee ballots cast and
counted would have been reconciled according to law. Instead these issues were exacerbated
by Beard with her determination to "allow all votes without making technical
disqualifications." 19 I
Extraordinary attempt by Brannon to verify the number oflegal absentee ballots
received. The Court-ordered count of absentee ballots counted in the election
did not match the number of absentee ballots reported to have been machine counted.
English said the most reasonable way to eliminate the ballot number discrepancy was
to count the ballots. 192 The district court ordered that Sr. Magistrate Marano physically count
all the absentee ballots that were counted in the 2009 Municipal Election. At all times prior to
Marano's count the ballots had been either held at the Sheriffs office, under lock and key, or
in Phillips' actual possession.1 93 Phillips was present when the absentee ballots were
transported from locked storage at the Sheriff s office to her office for counting by
Marano. 194 Marano's count took place on June 22,2010. 195 Phillips unsealed the three locked
ballot boxes containing the received and counted absentee ballots for the Municipality's 2009
election. The side of each of these three locked absentee ballot boxes identified the ballot

Mayl4, 20lO Hearing Tr. p. 41, 1. 9-16.
Plaintiffs Exhibit lOl, p. 6.
192 Plaintiffs Exhibit 90, p. 4, paragraph 12.
193 Tr. p. 370, I. 12-23.
194 Tr. p. 602, 1. 5-7.
195 Tr. p. 342, I. 19-20.
190
191
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counting machine that had counted the absentee ballots. They were

"machine #3 A",

"machine #3 B" and "machine #4".196
Marano testified that on June 22, 2010:
"I commenced counting the actual absentee ballots received and counted
in the 2009 City of Coeur d' Alene General Election.,,]97
"After my completion of the counting of the counted absentee ballots from
the ballot boxes from machine #3 A, machine #3 B, and machine 4,
I was advised by Carrie Phillips that those absentee ballots constituted
all of the absentee ballots counted in the 2009 City of Coeur d' Alene
General Election.,,198
"I was informed [by Carrie Phillips] that duplicate absentee ballots are
ballots that for one reason or another would not run through the counting
machine ... "
"I then added the totals from the written accounting, that I had
contemporaneously prepared, and I arrived at a total of 2027 absentee
ballots counted in the 2009 City of Coeur d' Alene General Election. This
number does not include the 17 duplicate ballots.,,199
Phillips told Marano that the ballots she gave to him to count were "all of the absentee ballot
counted in the 2009 City of Coeur d' Alene General Election." It is presumed that ballots kept
according to law are the true ballots. 2oo Marano's official count was 2027 absentee ballots
which is 24 fewer than the machine count given to the City.
Ten (10) days later, July 2, 2010, Marano was asked to return to count "other ballots
that had been located later.,,201 Phillips, the sole legal custodian of the absentee ballots, was
not present. 202 She did not how or where the "other ballots" were found. She did not testify

Plaintiff s Exhibit 97, R. p. 312-3 13 paragraph 5, 5 a, 5, b, 5 c ..
Plaintiffs Exhibit 97, R. p. 312, paragraph 5.
198 Plaintiffs Exhibit 97, R. p. 313.
199 Tr. p. 347, 1. 17-20;p. 378, I. 16-22. Plaintiffs Exhibit 97, page 3 paragraph 6.
200 A Treatise on the American Law of Elections, p. 287-288, Geo. W. McCrary, 1875. This is part of the public
domain and available on the internet.
201 Tr. p. 347, . 22-25
202 Tr. p. 591, 1. 5-8.
196

197
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what the "other ballots" were. She was only made aware that it [the count] occurred after the
fact. 203 Marano testified Beard gave him a ballot box with a label indicating Coeur d' Alene
write-in ballots 11/3/09. He did not testify, and neither did Beard, what machine they may
have been counted through. At the time of this count Beard had not been an employee of
Kootenai County for over seven months. 204 Beard was not the legal custodian of the absentee
ballots. She had no authority to access, handle or possess any absentee ballots. 205

Marano

wasn't told what it was he was counting. He testified, "I just counted seven.,,206 If what
Beard handed Marano were ballots, this was a classic "nonchalant and unsupervised"
handling of ballots that was strenuously objected to by the County when it tried to prevent
any examination. 207 0n July 14, 2010 Marano, for a third time, returned to the elections
department.
1. He was handed some documents to count, ballots.
2. He received 15 from Carrie Phillips and 2 from a person named Sherri Van Patten.
3. He was not told what they represented. 208

Phillips testified "I'm not a hundred percent sure" how this meeting came about. 209 She said
at the original time Marano "came to count the ballots2lo it was not brought up to see the
original duplicates.,,2l1 Neither Phillips nor anyone else provided any evidence where these

Tr. p. 591, I. 2-8.
Plaintiffs Exhibit 101, R. p. 324. Not only was Beard not an employee, her computer containing her e-mails
regarding the election had been cleaned prior to May 6, 2010, and the e-mails were thus "not available."
Plaintiffs Exhibit 98, p. 3 I 6.
205 I.e. § 34-20 18 confirms that only the person in possession or custody of ballots handle them.
206 Tr. p. 348, I. 19-24.
207 R. p. 520.
208 Tr. p. 349, I. 12-25, p. 350, p. 351, I. 1-2.
209 Tr. p. 593, I. 4-5.
210 Marano was ordered to count the absentee ballots cast and counted at the election. He did so. He counted and
repeatedly testified that there were 2027 absentee ballots that were cast and counted in the election. Carrie
Phillips, as reflected in Marano's Affidavit, Plaintiffs Exhibit 97, R. 3 I I establishes that Phillips told him that
he was given "all of the absentee ballots" at that time. Plaintiffs Exhibit 97, R. 313.
2lI Tr. p. 593, I. 5-9.
203

204
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"duplicate ballots" came from, when or how they were found, or whether they too had been
maintained in her custody or under lock and key at the Sheriffs office facility.
The official count of actual absentee ballots in the presence of their lawful custodian
[Phillips] occurred on June 22, 2009. The total absentee ballots counted by the election
machines, as is 2027. At the close of Marano's testimony he was asked, once and for all, to
confirm that the total number of absentee ballots counted in the 2009 election was 2027.
Kennedy's counsel objected because the evidence was clear as to the number Marano
counted.
"Mr. Erbland: ... This is-the point's been driven home again and
again. Why use six nails when one will dO?212 (emphasis added)
Marano, testified:

"Q ... So as the court-designated counter, tell me to the best of your
knowledge and information how many absentee ballots that were
counted in the 2009 City of Coeur d' Alene election did you come up
with? ... (objection and argument deleted)213
Q. Paragraph 6. 'I arrived at a total of2027 absentee ballots counted in the 2009
City of Coeur d' Alene general election.' Correct?
A. Are you asking me if that was-if I was correct the last time?
Q. Yep.
A. Yes.,,214
Marano's count established that twenty (24) absentee ballots fewer absentee ballots existed
than were recorded by the machine tabulations. The reason for Marano's count was to
establish the ballot number. This is a sufficient number to change the result in a 3 vote race.
Void absentee ballot intentionally counted.
I.C. § 50-447 requires that when an absentee ballot is received, but before it can be accepted
for counting, the signature on the envelope must be compared with the signature on the

Tr. p. 378, I. 9-11.
Kennedy's counsel argued "the points been driven home again and again. Why use six nails when one wiII
do?" Tr. P. 378, I. 9-11.
214 Tr. p. 377, I. 16-25, p. 378, I. 1-22.
212
213
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registration card. Beard testified that an absentee ballot envelope sent to Israel Melendez was
received back with a signature of 'Donna Melendez.' She further testified that she did not
know if she even tried to call Israel Melendez to attempt to ascertain if he had filled out the
ballot and sent back in the return envelope. Without a signature on the envelope matching his
registration form, the envelope and the enclosed ballot should have been voided. It was not
voided. This is one (1) more absentee ballot that should have been recorded as "Voided" on
the absentee ballot record and not counted. It was counted.

215

ARGUMENT
5. The district court erred in finding that the county counted
2051 valid absentee ballots based upon envelopes
The standard of review for district court's bench trial finding is whether it is "clearly
erroneous,,216 and whether it is supported by and competent evidence in the record?17
There is no competent evidence in the record that substantiates the district court's
finding that 2051 envelopes each containing one legal absentee ballot were received.

218

Even if it is assumed that a total of 2051 absentee ballot envelopes were returned and
that there was only one absentee ballot per envelope, there can only be a total of 2051
absentee ballots in existence. In order to support the court's finding that "the County did in
fact count 2051 valid absentee ballots sent in by 2051 valid absentee voters,,,219 every
absentee ballot in existence would have to have been

~

valid ballot. That is an impossibility

because English testified, and all evidence establishes, that at least five (5) of the returned

Plaintiffs Exhibit 5, page 108 documents the return of this absentee ballot and it not being Voided.
Pace v. Hymas, 1111daho 581, 726 P. 2d 693 (1986).
217 Noble v. Ada County Election Bd, 135 Idaho 495, 20 P. 3d 679 (2000).
218 Memorandum Decision, R. p. 2292.
219 Memorandum Decision, R. p. 2292.
215
216
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absentee ballots returned were voided and one was a double vote entry.220 At a maximum
only 2045 legal (non-voided") absentee ballots were returned to be counted. Using the district
court's 2051 and deducting the six (6) received absentee ballots that were voided, there can
only be a total of 2045 absentee ballots that were non-voided, and legal, to be counted. I.C. §
50-451 reinforces the obvious that voided ballots are not to be counted. Simply, if 2051
absentee ballots were in fact machine counted, the "voided" absentee ballots had to have
been counted illegally. This number is sufficient to change the election result for Seat 2.
ARGUMENT

6. The district court's finding that there was no error in
counting votes or declaring the election result is not
supported by competent evidence. 221
The standard of review is whether the decision was "clearly erroneous. ,,222 There must
be no competent evidence in support of the finding. 223
I.C. § 34-2001 (6) provides for an election to be set aside "for any error in any board of
canvassers in counting votes or in declaring the result of the election if the error would
change the result." The City's mayor and council are the board of canvassers. The canvassing
statute in 2009 provided:
The mayor and council, within six (6) days following any election, shall
meet for the purpose of canvassing the results of the election. Upon
acceptance of the tabulation of votes prepared by the election judges
and clerks, and the canvass as herein provided, the results of both shall
be entered in the minutes of proceedings and proclaimed as finaL."
This section requires three separate actions to be taken by the mayor and the city
council:
1. Canvass the results ofthe election;
Tr.p.213,1. 15-25,p. 214, I. 1-9.
Memorandum Decision, R. p. 2279.
222 Pace v. Hymas, 111ldaho 581, 726 P. 2d 693 (1986)
223 Noble v. Ada County Election Bd, 135 Idaho 495, 20 P. 3d 679 (2000).
22°
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2. After the canvass has been completed, accept the tabulation of votes;
3. After the canvass has been completed, accept the canvass.

Brannon attempted to elicit from Gridley what he, as the City's attorney, told the mayor and
city council to do in conducting a canvass. This question was objected to, and the objection
was sustained as "privileged" legal advice from him to the mayor and city counci1. 224 Gridley
was then asked what advice, if any, he provided as to the canvass. This was objected to and
sustained, but he went ahead and answered, "I don't knoW. 225 Gridley also testified that he
"didn't know" ifhe ever discussed a canvass with the mayor and counci1. 226 When asked ifhe
ever suggested to the mayor and city council they should "count votes" he replied:
"A. No. That was delegated to the County per contract.,,227

The City Clerk testified that the mayor and council's sole action consisted of "accepting their
[the County's] tabulation of votes.,,228 The

City Clerk testified: "That's a canvass.,,229

English first testified that a canvass was what the mayor and council does when they
"accept...the numbers that they have been provided. 23o When asked what his understanding of
"counting votes" was, he testified that "I'm just not clear." 231
Beard testified "we prepared for the canvass the next day" (November 4th) and that she
printed out the "District Canvass", Plaintiff's Exhibit 85, p. 36. 232 In preparing the City's
canvass Beard testified that she didn't compare the counting machine numbers with any other
document. 233 Beard testified she printed off the "District Canvass", Plaintiff's Exhibit 85 234 ,

Tr. p. 564, I. 19-25, p. 565, 1. 1-4.
Tr. p. 565, I. 5-10.
226 T r.p.565,1.11_15.
227 Tr. p. 565, I. 16-25.
228 Tr. p. 102,1. 11-16 ..
229 Tr. p. 102, 1. 17.
230
Tr. p. 183, I.14-23.
231 Tr. p. 185,1. 13-25, p. 186, I. 1.
232 Tr. p. 666, 1. 12-25.
233 Tr. p. 667, 1. 1-12.
224
225
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and that the data contained on it merely identifies the number of ballots run through the
machine and how many votes, based on absentee ballots run through the machine, were
counted for each candidate. 235 Beard failed to verify the total actual non-void absentee ballots
received matched the number the machine software showed were counted. The district court,
at the hearing on Brannon's motion for a new trial, unknowingly, put it best:
"I understand in our society that, if we put things into a computer and
have a printout, we all think that's golden and we'll believe it because
it's computer generated so it's got to be right. But...it's only as good
as the data entered.,,236"because you don't know what went into the data base.,,237
Machine data printed from the counting machine is not helpful, because the total number of
absentee ballots recorded as being counted exceeded the number of legal absentee ballots
returned. While the actual machine tabulations were never offered into evidence, if 2051
ballots were put into the machine to be counted, Brannon disputes that there were 2051 legal
(non-voided) absentee ballots in existence. 238 Literally no evidence supports that 2051 nonvoided absentee ballots exist. Without any evidence offered by Respondents through daily
reports or audit trails to establish otherwise, the only way that the machine count could be
2051 is for illegal ballots to have been counted. There is no evidence that 2051 legal ballots
existed to have been put into the machine and counted.
Since I.e. § 34-2001 (6) specifically provides that one ground of contest is "any error
in any board of canvassers in counting votes," it has to be determined what a "canvass" is.

Tr. p. 666, 1. 22-25.
Tr. p. 664, I.
236 December 7,2010, Hearing Tr. p. 79, I. 15-20.
237 December 7,2010, Hearing Tr. p. 80, 1. 3-4.
238 The November 6, 2009 absentee ballot record tabulated, without deducting the one offhe two votes attributed
to Harris, 2042 and Marano counted 2027.
234
235
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The U.S.

Election Assistance Commission (EAC) has published "Election

Management Guidelines." Chapter 13 of these Guidelines address "Canvassing and
Certifying an Election." Relevant portions of Chapter 13 provide:
"INTRODUCTION ...
The purpose of the canvass is to account for every ballot cast and
to ensure that each valid vote is included in the official results .... the
canvass means aggregating or confirming every valid ballot cast and
counted-absentee, early voting, Election Day... The canvas enables
an election official to resolve discrepancies, correct errors, and take
any remedial action necessary to ensure completeness and accuracy
before certifying the election." (emphasis added)
There is a reason why the Legislature gave the mayor and city council several days after
the election in which to canvass the vote and to certify the results. As the Guidelines correctly
go on to state:
"In almost every election, exceptions and issues arise during voting
that must be resolved."
The duty of the board of canvassers is to examine and resolve questions about these ballots.
,,* Exceptions include signature mismatches on absentee ballot envelopes
or in the poll books, damaged ballots, overvoted ballots, count/no
count determinations, and voter intent issues. In each exception
situation the exceptions and ballot board will physically review the
ballot and make a decision on how the ballot will be processed, in
accordance with state laws and regulations.
* Issues are ballots that have been counted incorrectly, have been
counted in error, or have not been counted at alL."
The mayor and council did not undertake any such actions. Beard exercised unsupervised
discretion in resolving all of these questions, and neither she nor any other election official
informed the mayor and council of the decisions she made in the course of the election. 239
1. When there was a question on an absentee ballot as to whether or not
the signature on the affidavit on the back of the envelope is that of
the elector casting that ballot, Beard made the final decision as to whether
239 Beard's operating procedure was to allow "all votes without making technical disqualifications." Plaintiff's
Exhibit 102, p. 6. Her unfettered liberality may not have been the same as the mayor and councils perspective on
"technical disqualifications."
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the elector casting that ballot, Beard made the final decision as to whether
or not it is a valid ballot. 241
2. When an absentee ballot return envelope came back with no signature
on it but there was an address label or bar code, Beard would have someone
try to notify the person that there was no signature and have them come
in to the office, or she would send someone out to their house. 242
No record was kept of telephone calls made. 243
3. When an absentee ballot return envelope comes in and the signature on
the back does not match the signature on the registration card or even
the name on the label, so long as there is an another envelope with the
with the person's name on it then Beard allowed both to be counted. 244
4. The board of canvassers did not review damaged ballots.
5. Beard made all decisions of whether or not to count an absentee ballot .245
6. Beard made no overvote determination. Beard made no determination
whether ballots had been counted correctly or counted in error. Beard
did not keep, or possess, the statutorily required absentee ballot
record. 246 Beard didn't compare the machine count number with any
other documentation. 247
The Guidelines set forth methods for "accounting for votes following
an election."
1. Inspection of the returns from voting sites-early voting sites, polling
places, vote centers.
2. Review records of poll workers documenting any problems in the election.
3. Review all ballots that have to be duplicated before processing.
4. Review ballots that have been rejected.
5. Reconcile all ballots cast outside the polling place and precincts
including regular absentee ballots and UOCAV A ballots.
6. Confirm that the number of accepted and rejected challenged ballots
equal the number of challenged ballots cast.
The mayor and council did not perform any accounting. They did not conduct a
canvass. Having not canvassed the election they could not lawfully "accept" the tabulation of
the votes printed out from the machine by Beard. They could not have legally proceeded to
the last step of a canvass to "accept the canvass" as required by I.C. § 50-467.
241 Tr. p. 615, I. 22-25, p. 616, I. 1-11.
242 Tr.616,I. 19-25,p. 617, I. 1-4.
243 Tr. p. 623, I. 9-13.
244 Tr. p. 619, I. 16-25. I.e. § 50-447 does not provide that an absentee return envelope signed by a person
whose name does not correspond to the name on the registration card for that baIlot can be inferred to be the
ballot of the person whose name is on the registration card. It is void.
245 Tr. p. 615, I. 22-25.
246 Tr. p. 667-668.
247Tr. p.667, I. 1-12.
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As if an exclamation point to the haphazard manner in which the election was
conducted, the minutes of the canvass meeting fail to establish Bruning was present to second
the motion to accept the County's tabulation. There is no evidence that the election results,
although based upon the faulty tally, were even certified by the mayor and council. There is
no competent evidence that supports the district court's determination that the mayor and
council did not err in counting votes, and it erred in declaring the results of the election valid.
In the election for Seat 2, the district court found the difference in votes was three (3).
All of the errors listed above would change the election result.
ARGUMENT
7. It was error for the district court to fail to shift the
burden of proof to City and Kennedy after Brannon
met his burden of proving a prima facie case that
more absentee ballots were counted than the total
number of non-voided absentee ballots in existence.

This presents a question of law over which the Court exercises free review. The general
rule as to burden of proof applies in election contests. 248 The district court did not shift the
burden of proof.
"But there just isn't any legal basis for this Court to find that in this
case I'm going to shift the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the
defendant...I don't know what the reason for that would be other than
the fact that it's an election case ... .I can't find an Idaho case that shifts
the burden of proof. There just isn't any legal basis for this Court to
shift the burden of proof. ,,249
Brannon met his burden of proving a prima facie case. He introduced evidence
establishing that the machine tally totaled more than the number of legal (non-voided)
absentee ballots received by six (6). It was established also that there were four additional
ballots of Proft, Ainsworth, White, and Zellars that were illegal because of residency and

248
249

Noble v. Ada County Elections Board, 135 Idaho 495, 20 P. 3d 679 (2000).
December 7, 2010, Hearing Tr. p. 86.
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should not have been counted. Also, Marano testified that he counted only 2027 absentee
ballots that were counted.

250

In short, no evidence was introduced that established that 2051

legal absentee ballots were machine counted, and every discrepancy established that more
than three (3) votes were counted when they should not have been. Brannon met his burden
of proof. The burden of proof should have shifted to the City and Kennedy to somehow
prove otherwise. Respondents recognized that no evidence established that 2051 legal
absentee ballots were, or could have been, counted. In closing arguments one of Kennedy's
counsel conceded the failure of the evidence.
"Mr. Erbland: I would have no objection to reopening the evidence
and having Deedie Beard testify. 251
The district court denied the offer.,,252
Brannon proved the elements of his case.
The district court, deeply concerned given its predilection against election contests,
was particularly upset by Marano's

testimony that established that only 2027 absentee

ballots physically existed. The district court's outburst in the midst of Kennedy's closing
argument is illustrative.
"MR. ERBLAND: No, May I-may I quote Judge Marano's affidavit?
THE COURT: Jesus.
MR. ERBLAND: He says, I verified that there were 15 duplicate-THE COURT: Judge Marano doesn't know squat about the
question that I'm asking. He doesn't know anything about what
I am asking. ,,253
The district court erred in not shifting the burden of proof to the City and Kennedy.

ARGUMENT
8. It was error to hold the City could contractually
250 The only purpose of Marano's official count, on a date certain pursuant to court order, was to erase any
question as to the number of absentee ballots in existence.
251 September 18,2010 Hearing Tr. p. 42, 1. 15-17.
252 September 18, 2010 Hearing Tr. p. 42, 1. 17-18.
253 September 18,2010 Hearing Tr. p. 45, I. 3-9.
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delegate all its election duties to the County.

The Court exercises free review over matters of statutory interpretation. 254 On August
18, 2009 the City adopted a resolution to contract to delegate all City officials' and
employees' duties required pursuant to the Idaho Municipal Election Laws to the County.255
The contract is Defendants' Exhibit B. The City attorney and the City Clerk confirmed the
intent and the effect of the contract was a complete and total delegation of their duties and
authority to the County.256
From 1993 until 2011 Idaho Municipal Election Laws expressly did not permit the
delegation of all of the City'S, City Clerk's, mayor and council's election duties to the
County. Cities are units of local government. They assist in the governing of the state by
providing local government functions to urban areas. This is referred to as "governmental"
power. 257 The Idaho Constitution provides that cities may not act in conflict with general
laws of the state. 258 General laws may confer direct authority to a City to act as well as
supply procedural requirements for taking the action?59
Under Idaho's constitution, suffrage and elections are the sole province and duty of the
state legislature. 26o Idaho has long recognized that a municipality, as a creature of the state,
possesses and exercises only those powers either expressly or impliedly granted to it.

261

Title

254 State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 208 P. 3d 730 (2009); Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho
388, 111 P. 3d 73 (2005)
255 Defendants' Exhibit A.
256 Tr. p. 565, I. 16-25, p. 106, p. 105, 1. 17-25, p. 106, 1. 1-24.
257 see Powers and Authorities of Idaho Cities: Home Rule or Legislative Control? Michael C. Moore, 14 Idaho
L. Rev. 143 (1977-1978)/
258 Idaho Constitution, Article 2 § 2.
259 Citizens For Better Government v. Valley County, 95, Idaho 320,322,508 P. 2d 550 (1973).
260 Idaho Constitution, Article VI § 1.
261 Caesarv. State, 101 Idaho 158,160, 61OP. 2d517 (1980)
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50, Chapter 4, of the Idaho Code, Idaho Municipal Election Laws, set forth the authority
granted to the City and the procedure which a City is to follow in conducting a City election.
Idaho follows Dillon's Rule which provides:
"Municipal corporations possess and can exercise the following powers
and no others: first, those granted in express words; second, those
necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly
granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared
objects and purposes of the corporation,--not simply convenient, but
. d'
'bl ,,262
III lspensl e.
The City's total delegation of all election duties to the County effectively destroyed the
power given to it by the legislature. A city cannot act in an area so completely covered by
general law as to indicate that it is a matter of state concern. 263 If a city enactment or action
conflicts with state law, it is invalid. 264 The 2009 Election Manual for City Clerks instructs
Cities and City Clerks that the "most significant election reform bill of the past several
decades" will take effect in 2011 265 . All Respondents asserted that all the municipality's
statutory election duties could be delegated to the County. The contract provides that "The
City shall have no control over the performance of this agreement by the County.,,266 Such an
agreement expands the City's authority under the Idaho Municipal Election Laws. It renders
superfluous the express wording ofLC. § 34-1401 that provides:
" ... and municipal elections governed by the provisions of chapter 4, title 50
are exempt from the provisions of this chapter. All municipal elections shall
be conducted pursuant to the provisions of chapter 4, title 50, Idaho Code,
except that they shall be governed by the election dates authorized in 34-1 06,
Idaho Code, the registration procedures prescribed in section 34-1402, Idaho
262 Caesar v. State, 101 Idaho 158, 160, 610 P. 2d 517 (l980)Powers and Authorities of Idaho Cities: Home
Rule or Legislative Control? Michael C. Moore, 14 Idaho L. Rev.
143,146.
263 Id. p. 660.
264 Powers and Authorities of Idaho Cities: Home Rule or Legislative Control? Michael C. Moore, 14 Idaho L.
Rev.
265 Defendants' Exhibit G, p. 8.
266 Defendants' Exhibit A, p. 3, paragraph 4.
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Code, and the time the polls are open pursuant to section 34-1409, Idaho Code"
(emphasis added)
When the legislature makes a municipality "exempt" from the provisions of a chapter it
means that all the sections within the chapter are "inapplicable" to a municipality.267 This
statutory language was enacted in 1993. The legislature chose to not change this language
until January 1, 2011. Courts do not presume that the legislature performed an idle act by
enacting a meaningless provision. 268
Respondents asserted the City Clerk had "authority to have anybody to carry out the
election,,,269 and "Cities were released from liability in the event that any election did not
conform to" election law. 27o The district court held the contract was a valid delegation based
on the last paragraph of I.C. § 34-1401 that provided, after excluding municipalities, that:
"A political subdivision may contract with the county clerk to conduct all
or part of the elections for that political subdivision. In the event of such
a contract, the county clerk shall perform all necessary duties of the
election official of a political subdivision including, but not limited
to, notice of the filing deadline, notice of the election, and preparation
of the election calendar, et cetera.,,271
Brannon moved for reconsideration. The motion was denied. The district court stated:
" ... there is express statutory authority allowing the City to contract with
the County" ... there's ambiguities there ... there's nothing in the statute
that expressly prohibits the contracting between the City and
the County .. .I can't think of any public policy reason as to why ...
the Court would enforce a rule of law that would require the average
citizen to go to two different polling places on election day ... I don't
see any social or public policy served by the interpretation .. .it
seems consistent with how you'd want to run an election.,,272

see Plummer v. City of Fruitland, 139 Idaho 810,814,87 P. 3d 297 (2004).
Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 798 P. 2d 27,31 (1990); Brown v. Caldwell School District No. 132, 127
Idaho 112, 898 P. 2d 43 (1995).
269 R. p. 149.
270 R. p. 148.
271 March 2,2010 Hearing Tr. p. 63, 1. 9-18.
272 May 14, 2010 Hearing Tr. p. 10-11.
267
268
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If a statute is unambiguous, statutory construction is unnecessary and courts apply the plain
meaning.

273

With plain language a court must not undertake a process of construction to

avoid its perception of an inconvenience to the public. In 1992 the legislature granted
authority to municipalities and city clerks to delegate their election duties to the county clerk.
(1992)
CHAPTER 14
UNIFORM DISTRICT ELECTION LAW
SECTION 4. That Title 34, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby amended
by the addition thereto of a NEW CHAPTER, to be known and designated as Chapter 14,
Title 34, Idaho Code, and to read as follows:
34-1401. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION. Notwithstanding any provision to
the contrary, the election official of each political subdivision shall administer
all elections on behalf of any political subdivision, subject to the provisions
of this chapter, including all municipal elections, special district elections, and
elections of special questions submitted to the electors as provided in this chapter.
School districts governed by title 33, Idaho Code, and water districts governed by
chapter 6, title 42, Idaho Code, are exempt from the provisions of this chapter. For
the purposes of achieving uniformity, the secretary of state shall, from time to time,
provide directives and instructions to the various county clerks and political
subdivision election officials. Unless a specific exception is provided in this chapter,
the provisions of this chapter shall govern in all questions regarding the conduct of
elections on behalf of all political subdivisions. In all matters not specifically covered
by this chapter, other provisions of title 34, Idaho Code, governing elections shall
prevail over any special provision which conflicts therewith. A political subdivision
may contract with the county clerk to conduct the elections for that political
subdivision. In the event of such a contract, the county clerk shall perform all necessary
duties of the election official of a political subdivision including, but not limited to,
notice of lithe filing deadline, notice of the election, and preparation of the election
calendar.
In 1993, the Idaho Legislature amended this statute with two new statutory enactments.
The House Bills presented to the legislators to review in their consideration of the proposed
amendments to the 1992 law, graphically display through interlineation and addition the
amendments enacted in 1993.
(1993)
HOUSE BILL NO. 330
273

Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn 141 Idaho 307, 109 P. 3d 161 (2005)
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SECTION 5. That Section 34-1401. Idaho Code, as added by Chapter
Lays of 1992, be, and the same is hereby amended to read as follows!

176,

34-1401. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION. Notwithstanding any provision to the
contrary, the election official of each political subdivision Shall administer
all elections on behalf of any political subdivision. subject to the provisions of this chapter, including all mttnfeipa~-eiee~ien$, special district
elections, and elections of special questions submitted to the electors as
provided in this chapter. School districts governed by title ,33, Idaho Code,
and water district! governed by chapter 6, title 42. Idaho Code, irrigation
districts governed by title 43, Idaho Code, are exempt from the provisions of
this chapte.r. All municipal elections shalt be conducted pursuant to the provisions of chapter 4, title SO. Idaho Code, except that they-shall be governed
by the elections dates autno-rized in section 34-106, Idaho Code, theregistration procedures prescribed in section 34-1402. Idaho Code. and the time the
polls are open pursuant to 6ection 34-1409. Idaho Code. For the purposes of
achieving uniformitYt the secretary of state shall, from time to time, provide
directives and instructions to the various county clerks and political suhdivision election officials. Unleu a specific: exception is provided in this
chapter, the provisions of this chapter shall govern in all questions regarding the conduct of elections on behalf of all political subdivisions. Tn all
matters not specifically covered by this chapter, other provisions of title
34, Idaho Code, governing elections shall prevail Over any special provision
which conflicts therewith.
A political subdivision may contract with the county clerk to conduct all
o.t:_.pa.t:t- ~f.th~ de~::J:j}m.JQt: tMt.Jloliti~at s:ll:l:3diyision. In the_eyent 0.( such
a contract, the county clerk shall perform all necessary duties of the elec·
tion official of a political subdivision including. but not limited to. notice
of the filing deadline, notice of the election, and preparation of the election calendar.

34-1401. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION. Notwithstanding any prOvlSlon to the
contrary. the election offi-cial 'Of lellth political s'ubdi:viSion shaH administer
all elections on behalf of any political subdivision, subject to the provisiems of this chapter, including all mUftiC±pd-ei:eetd:oru.j' special district.
elections, and elections of special questions submitted to the electors as
provided in this chapter. School districts governed by title 33, Idaho Code,
and water districts gOV6t'ned by chapter 6, title 42. Idaho. Code, irrigation
governed by title 43, Idaho Code, and 'muni(i!al' elecilQossovernej
by the provisions of cM:pter 4, title SO,Id9;ho C,J~ij ~re'-exempt 'from the .Pt'9'·
visions of this chapter. For the purposes afc'achievIng unifot1llLt:y,the secretary of state shall. from time to time, provide directives and instructions to
the varl.Qus county clerks and potiticalsub<iivision election: oUicials. Unless

district9'

a specifie exception is provided in this chapter. the provision, of this ~hap
ter shall govern in all questions regarding the eondu~t of elections on behalf
of aU poHtieat subdivisions. In all matters· '~otspecifically covered by this
chapter, other provisions of title 34, Idaho Code, governiQg electiens shall
nrpvAil Ovpr

An~ ~nAeiAl

nravi§1on uhieh

eonfli~t~

(1993)
HOUSE BILL NO. 335
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tharauith.

SECTION 5. That Se~tion 34-1401, Idaho Coda, as added by Chapter
Laws of 1992, be, and the same is hereby amended to read as follows:

176,

34-1401. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION. Notwithstanding any provision to the
contrarYt the election official of each political subdivision shall administer
all elecdans on behalf af any political subdivisiOfit subject to the provisions of this chapter, including all mttnieipa~-eteetion., special district
elections, and elections of special questions submitted to the electors as
provided in this chapter. School districts governed by title ·33, Idaho Code,
and water districts governed oy chapter 6 t title 42, Idaho Code, irrigation
districts governed by title 43, IdahO Code, are exempt from the provisions of
thi s chapter. All municipal elections shall be conducted put'suant to the p;t'ovisions of chapter 4, title SO. Idaho Code. except that they-shall be governed
bI the elections datesautho1."ized in section 34-106 1 Idaho Code! the. reg,istracion procedut'es p~escribed in section 34-1402. Idaho Cadet and the time the
polls are open pursuant to section 34-1409, Idaho Code. For the purposes of
achieving uniformity. the secretary of state shall, from time to time, provide
directives and ins.tructions to the vadou!! county clerks and political subdivision election officials. Unless a specific exception is provided in thi!!
chapter, the provisions of this chapter shall govern in all questions regarding the conduct of elections on behalf of all political subdivisions. In all
matters not specifically covered by this chaptet", other provisions of title
34, Idaho Code, governing elections shall prevail over any special provision
which conflicts therewith.
A political subdivision may contract with the county derk to conduct all
.oxp.A:rt......i1("th~itlec_tion~LJ.Qr t~tP9l.iti~cats.ut)divj.sion. In thepeye:nt of such
a contract. the county clerk shall perform all necessary duties of the election offic::iaJ. of a political subdivision including, but not limited to. notice
of the filing deadline, notice of the election, and preparation of the election calendar.

The 1993 amendments specifically removed the authority of municipalities to contract
with counties to run their elections. However the City did not change how it ran its elections.
In construing statutes the Court assumes that when a statute is amended that the legislature
intended the statute to have a meaning different from the meaning accorded the statute before
the amendment. 274

The district court erred in determining the legislation was too

inconvenient for the public. 275
"I can't think of any public policy reason as to why you would have-why the Court would enforce a rule of law that would require the
average citizen to go to two different polling places on election day
to vote .. .! mean, that doesn't serve any democratic principles that
I understand. I don't see any social or public policy served by the
interpretation ... [having the County conduct all election duties] seems

274

Stewart v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, 138 Idaho 509, 512, 65 P. 3d 531, 534 (2003).

275

No party asserted different polling places were required. That is the type of service that could be contracted.
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to be consistent with how you'd want to run an election. ,,276
Construction of a statute will not be followed if it contradicts the clear expression of
the legislature. As the Court has previously stated:
"The most fundamental premise underlying judicial review of the
legislature's enactments is that, unless the result is palpably absurd,
the courts must assume the legislature meant what it said.,,277
The legislature clearly spoke on who was required to conduct municipal elections and
how they were required to be held from 1993 until 2011. The words of statutes are to be
given their plain meaning unless a contrary legislative purpose is expressed or the plain
meaning creates an absurd result. 278 The City Clerk, with assistance if he wanted it, was to
conduct the election, and the City's mayor and council was required to conduct the canvass.

Effective, January 1, 2011, Idaho Legislature, reversed direction and changed its
mind. New legislation was enacted that transferred all municipal election duties to the
counties. The amendments also effectively highlight the changes that were made.
(EFFECTIVE 2011)
HOUSE BILL NO. 221

SECTION 58. That Section 34-1401, Idaho Code. be, and the same is hereby amended to
read as fonows:

May 14,2010 Hearing Tr. p. 10, I. 24-25, p. 11, I. 1-17.
State, Dep't a/Law Enforcement v. One 1955 Willy's Jeep, 100 Idaho 150, 153.595 P.2d 1206, 1219 (1991)
278 State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326,208 P. 3d 730 (2009)
276
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4, dUe §QJ lEift.fte 6eEJe; are exempt from the provisions of this chapter. AU municipal:,
schoo] distr\'l~, and highway district eJections shall be conducted pursuant to the provisions of
this chapter ! 4. title ~~ Idaho Code, 6!feept ~ tohey Eih~l &e ge"'efflee 'By ~e eieMisft9 aMes
fM:ltheri2eEl Ie 5&&tleft 34 196, Waite beae, th& regfetmtien preetld~ preseriheEI in esetisH
34 H~. leMa G6Ele~ f!ftd the time t:he peUs tie efJeR ~ te seatteR lH 1499, IElake Gadi.
-AIHtighway--district-and 9001 district -elections'-sha:trtleaaministered'by' the clerk or-the
county wherein the dimietlies. Elections ina joint school district shall be conducted joint!!
by the clerks of the resp~ctive counti~ and the clel'kof the home counsY slWl exercise such
powers as are necessaty to coordinate the election. For the purposes of achieving uniformity,

the secretary of state shall. from time to time, provide directives and instructions to the
various county clerks eftS ,eUtieltl ~i9ieu: e1eeeiefl Mii~. Unless a specific exception is
provided in this chapter, the provisions of this chapter shaU govern in aU questions regarding
the conduct of elections on behalf of all political subdivisions. In all matters not specmcaUy
covered by thi.s chapter, other provisions of title 34, Idaho Code. governing eJections shall
prevail over any special provision which conflicts therewith.
A pelitietll slthdi¥iaien may eElllft'ee* with t1he county clerk t& !!!!t! conduct ell Sf J!NUI1:
$ the eleetionsfur ~ political subdivlsi0ll!. Ht the e:'lMt sf saeh e eetUmet; tile El8Uflty
eIft !!!9. shall perfonn aU necessary duties of the election official of a political subdivision
including. but not limited 10* notice of the filing deadline, notice of the election, and preparation
of the election calendar.
ehepter 4, ti1::le 59. IEWte Qed&; are exempt from the provisions of this chapter. All municipal;.
school district and highwa:x district elections shaH be conducted: pursuant to the provisions of
!bi! chapter 14. title ~~ Idaho Code. 6!teeptdtlit tohe>y $h~1 ee ge';efflee &y ~e' eleetieM aates
autftereEl ift 9eetiea 34· 196, Waite Geee~· the ~ien preeedl:H'e9 p~ri"ed iH Beetien
34 14Q;!,~ laue Seae. Mti the time tile :f.Ie11a tie ej'IeR pHf8\lfl:Rt te seetiss 34 1499, lemiE" eadi.
-AlHlighwa:r:s!i!trict-and school,. -dimi.ct;-eledions--m-alrbeai.lmin.tsooroo!?X "me oICrlt'or-ffie
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various county clerks efte,elitieai 6~'i:s:ieH ~ft e@Miela. Unless a specific exception is
provided in this chapter, the provisions of this chapter shan govern in all questions regarding
the conduct of elections on behalf of aU political subdIvisions. In aU matters not specifically
covered by this chaptert other provisions of title 34, Idaho C~ governing elections shaU

prevail over any special provision which conflicts therewith.
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50-403. SUPERVISION OF ADMINISTRATION OF ELECTION LAWS BY ~
COUNTY CLERK. For e&ch city ~~ the county clerk of the county is the chief elections
officer and shaH exercise general supervision of the administration of the election laws in
h:i& !b.£ city for the purpose of achieving and maintaining a maximum. degree of correctness,
impartiality. efficiency and uniformity. The ~ county clerk shall meet with and issue

SECTION 103. That Sections 504~, 50405, 50406, 50-407, S().408. SQ.,-409. ~O~lP~
50-411 and 50-412, Idaho Code, be, and the same are hereby repealed.

5Q-4..i.Q4. REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS. All electors must register befnre being
able to vote at any municipal election. The county clerk shall be the registrar for aU city
elections and shall conduct voter registration for each city pursuant to t:he provisions of it8etieft
34 l..f~ chapter 4. title Ht Idaho Code. Tn be eligible to Rpm! to vote in OR elections? a
m:rson !hall be at least eighteen (18) leafS of agn. a citizen of the United States and a resident
of the city for at least thirty (30) days next pr:eceding the election at which.~ desires to vote,
or a resident of an area annexed PI a city pursuan~ to the pt2visions of ~r 2, title 50, Idaho

Code.
SECTION 105. That Sections

50-415~

50-427 and 50-428. Idaho Code. be,. and the same

are hereby repealed.
(4) Pursuant to section 34-1401. Idaho Code, aU municip:U elections shall be conducted
by the county clerk: of the county wherein the citv lies. and elections shaH be admjnistered in
accordance with the provisions oft.tIe 34, Idaho Code•. except as those provisions are srn;cificaUy modified by the provisions of this chapter. After an election has been ordered, aU exe!'oses associated with coooucting municipaLgeneral and special ejections shall be paid from
the coun~ election fund as provided by section 34-141 L Idaho Code. Expxnses associated
with cooouctingrunotf elections shall be paid by the city adoetin.8, runoff elections pursuant to
,tl]~. provisions of sectiqn 50..(j I 2 or So.. 70m; Idaho Code, or both.

5~12,
CAWASSING VOTES - DETERJv1INING RESULTS OF ELECTION. The
Mtt)"ef'ftfta ~ eeHMii county commissioners. within ~ ten,! 0) days following any election, shall meet for the purpose of canvassing the results of the election. Upon acceptance
of tabulation of votes prepared by the election judges and c1erk~ and the canvass as herein
provided. the results of both shall be entered in the minutes of ci,ll' council proceedings and
proclaimed as final. Results of election shaH be determined as follows: in the case of a single
office to befiUed. the candidate with the highest number of votes shall be dedared elected.; in
the case where more than one ill office is to be filled, that number of candidates receiving the
highest number of votes, equal to the number of offices to be nl1OO, shaH he declared elected.
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The effort to support the inappropriate delegation extended so far that Kennedy's
counsel prepared an affidavit for Mr. Hurst in which he characterized "the most significant
election reform bill of the past several decades,,279 as "some changes in wording.,,28o The
contract between the City and County violates the essential requirements of the 1993 la~81
and is void. In addressing Ada County's attempt to enter into a contract that would change a
zoning ordinance, the Court held the county commissioners did not have the authority, and
the agreement and actions under it are void. 282

ARGUMENT
9. The district court erred in dismissing the claim seeking
to set aside the entire 2009 General Election and only
retaining the claim to set aside the election for Seat 2.
This presents a question of law, over which the Court exercises free review, a question
of an abuse of discretion, and a question of statutory interpretation.
From Brannon's perspective the election contest always has been a challenge to the
untrustworthy conduct of the 2009 election. As the Court in Henley v. Elmore Countr83
stated:
A contested election, whatever the form of the proceeding may be, is in
itself a proceeding in which the people-the constituency-are primarily
and principally interested. It is not a suit for the adjudication and settlement
of private rights.
Respondents defense approach caused the presiding judges to view the case to only be about
which candidate won the Seat 2 race. The City's position always has been that "the City was

Defendants' Exhibit G, p. 8.
R. p. 989.
281 Which actions are set forth in the facts and argument below.
282 Ada County, by Ed. o/County Com 'rs v. Walter, 96 Idaho 630, 632,533 P.2d 1199 (1975).
283 Henley v. Elmore County, 72 Idaho 374, 381-282,242 P. 2d 855 (1952)
279

280
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not part of this election" and it didn't want to be bothered. 284 The discussion leading up to
the district court's requiring a $40,000.00 cost bond is illustrative.
Mr. Kelso: .. Anything beyond [a $500.00 bond] would be overly burdensome to
Mr. Brannon ... [it would be] essentially taking a very fundamental constitutional
right away from a person to challenge an election by imposing an egregious
number as a bond ...
The Court: This is a cause of action between your client and Mr. Kennedy.
Mr. Kelso: .. Still the fundamental issue in any election contest is the interest
of the public.
The Court: I understand what you are saying but-I am going to require posting
a bond in the amount of $40,000. 285
The district court (J. Simpson) dismissed all claims against the Municipality, mayor, City
Clerk, and council members but retained Kennedy as a party, contesting Seat 2. 286 Brannon
sought reconsideration of this dismissal and argued that the district court's decision on the
statute, because of the sweeping dismissal, acted as a sub silentio dismissal of the entire
election contest. The motion was heard by J. Hosack because J. Simpson had withdrawn.
The Amended Complaint alleged "acts or failures to act,,,287 on the part of the City
and City Clerk based upon twelve detailed paragraphs of specific allegations,288 and the
Complaint asserted that such actions constitute such malconduct that the election should be
set aside, voided, and or annulled all or in part?89
The Prayer for Relief seeks Judgment declaring that the entire 2009 City of Coeur
d' Alene municipal election be set aside, void, and annulled in total.,,290 The fact that Brannon
was the only candidate that had the conviction to seek to ensure that democracy was being

May 14,2010 Hearing Tr. p. 39, I. 16-17.
March 2, 2010 Hearing Tr. p.67-68.
286 March 2, 2010 Hearing Tr. p. 63, I. 24-25, p. 64, I. 1-4. R. p. 793.
287
R. p. 84 .
288 R. p. 85-89.
289 R. p. 89.
290 R. p. 91. Paragraph 2 sought Judgment declaring the 2009 City of Coeur d' Alene municipal election for Seat
2 is set aside, void, and annulled.
284

285
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protected did not affect his standing under I.C. §§ 50-406 (1) and (3) to contest the entire
election. 291 Brannon is a resident of the City, was a council candidate, and is an "aggrieved"
and "adversely affected" person. These words are not defined in Title 50 Chapter 4, but it
would produce an absurd result to hold he did not have a sufficient interest to challenge the
election. I.C. §§ 50-406 (person) and 34-2007 (elector) provide that persons adversely
affected may contest an election.
When the district court (J. Simpson)

granted

the City's Motion to Dismiss, it

dismissed the Amended Complaint against the City defendants without addressing the other
claims despite stating:
"I find that the plaintiff has met the requirements of pleading under
34, chapter 20 .. .1 think it is clearly an election contest.,,292
The district court, as evidenced by its order setting the cost bond at $40,000.00, did not want
the election contest to continue. 293 It is a fortiori that no person running for a Coeur d' Alene
city council seat that pays $750 per month294 would post a $40,000.00 cost bond to seek to
prove an election was fatally flawed.
On the motion to reconsider their dismissal, Judge Hosack also held the City could
contract with the County, but he brought the City and City Clerk back into the election
contest only as "nominal parties,,295 stating, "I don't really know what difference it
makes.,,296 J. Hosack didn't bring the City and City Clerk back into the election contest to
defend its city election. It was, after all, the City's election and its responsibility to conduct it.

The district court never held Brannon did not have standing to contest the entire election.
March 2, 2010 Hearing Tr. p. 63, I. 6-9.
293 Brannon just wanted the City to concede the absentee ballot numbers discrepancy and hold another election.
The May 2010 primary election date would have been an appropriate time to hold the new election.
294 Coeur d'Alene Ordinance 3305 § 1,2007.
295 May 14,2010 Hearing Tr. p. 45, I. 1.
296 May 14, 2010 Hearing Tr. p. 45, I. 10-11.
291

292
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The district court (1. Hosack) stated that it didn't see anything in the amended complaint that
talks about any office other than Seat 2. 297 The filed amended complaint however, based upon
the failures in the conduct of the election and Brannon's status as an aggrieved person under
I. C. § 50-406, sought the entire election set aside. 298
The district court was advised the Amended Complaint contained allegations of
malconduct that were "quite detailed.,,299 The district court viewed the contest as merely
addressing illegal votes counted. The malconduct claim was treated as being one in the same
as an I.C. § 34-2001 (5) claim of "illegal votes received." The court reaffirmed the dismissal
ofthe claim seeking a new election on all races by erroneously going outside the pieadings300
and proceeded, without any evidentiary record, to enter a finding:
" ... but even if it [malconduct] has been alleged, it isn't sufficient
to change the result. 301
The district court erred in dismissing the malconduct claim, the claim to set aside the entire
election, and failed to exercise his discretion in a manner consistent with legal standards for
determining of motions to dismiss and reconsideration. 302

ARGUMENT
10. The district court erred in refusing to consider the
the affidavit submitted and denying the motion
for a new trial or amended judgment.
The Court exercises free review over the district court's failure to comply with
procedural rules. 303

May 14,2010 Hearing Tr. p. 9, I. l3-25.
R. P. 86, paragraphs 22, 23.
299 May 14, 2010 Hearing Tr. p. 42, 1. 23-25, p. 43, 1. 1-11.
300 Owsley v. Idaho Industrial Commission, 141 Idaho 129, 106 P. 3d 455 (2005).
30] May 14,2010 Hearing Tr. p. 47,1. 14-17.
302 Blanc v. State, 36294, 36295 (IDCCA); State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 768 P.2d 1331 (1989).
303 Ernest v. Hemenway and Moser, Co., Inc., 120 Idaho 941,821 P. 2d 996 (1991).
297
298
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Brannon's motion for a new trial was based upon IRCP Rule 59 (a) (6) and (7). These
grounds for a new trial, while not specifically requiring an affidavit to be filed in support, do
not require that an affidavit submitted in support of the motion must not be considered
Neither the City nor Kennedy objected to the affidavit. The purpose of an affidavit in
support of a motion for a new trial is to give notice of facts previously unknown to the trial
court which support the motion. 304 That was the purpose of the affidavit submitted to the
district court.
The district court utilized its own interpretation of Marano's testimony, unsupported by
any competent evidence, to find, despite Marano's official count which was undertaken so
that there would be no question as to the number of envelopes, that 2051 envelopes existed in
a "stack". The County conceded that at the official count of City envelopes Marano was
given four envelopes that "for some reason,,305 could not be determined whether or not they
were City election envelopes. This discrepancy of four envelopes, and thus ballots, that the
County couldn't tell if they were City envelopes, is sufficient to change the result of the
election. Despite Marano's official count, the district court accepted Phillips testimony that at

some "unknown date,

,,306

after Marano's count, that 'it was determined' by someone

without any explanation of the basis therefor, that 32 of the envelopes given to Marano as
City envelopes, were actually County envelopes. Without any evidence, or even an assertion,
the district court found that one envelope must have been lost. By deducting four unknown
envelopes and deducting the other 32 envelopes determined at some time by someone after
Marano's count to be County envelopes, from the 2086 counted by Marano the district court

304

Ernest v. Hemenway and Moser, Co. Inc., 120 Idaho 941,821 P. 2d 996 (1991).

305
306

R. p. 2288.

Tr. p. 594, 1.6-15.
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arrived at 2050 City envelopes. Since even that total didn't match the 2051 machine counted
ballots the district court, without any evidence or suggestion by the County, found that one
envelope had been lost and thus there were really 2051 absentee envelopes and ballots in
existence. 306 The memorandum decision refers to a "stack" of envelopes on several
occasions, even though the no envelopes were introduced. Brannon didn't offer the envelopes
because Marano's official count was held to eliminate any questions about the number of
envelopes and ballots.
All of the envelopes provided to the district court with the affidavit, were marked
"Voided.,,307 The envelopes with the affidavit are City election returned absentee ballot
envelopes for the 2009 election. The district court's finding that there were 2050 valid
envelopes in existence (with one lost) could not possibly be correct. The absentee ballot
return envelopes were submitted to the district court to show that it's calculation used to
reach a total of 2051 absentee ballot return envelopes, could not possibly be correct.
It was error for the district court to refuse to consider the affidavit and it was error for

the district court to not grant the requested new trial or to amend its decision and judgment to
hold that sufficient evidence had been introduced to contest the election and to set it aside.
CONCLUSION
The Idaho Municipal Election Law's essential election safeguards were knowingly
disregarded by election workers. The single most important record necessary to ensure an
accurate count, the absentee ballot record, was knowingly not prepared when the polls closed.
No pre-count verification of valid absentee ballots returned was conducted. Chief Deputy
Secretary of State Hurst described the failure to prepare the statutorily required absentee
306
307

R. p. 2288.
R. p. 2364-2368.
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ballot record at the close of the polls as a breach of duty. The first absentee ballot record
clearly revealed a ten vote discrepancy. Election workers were aware of this discrepancy but
ignored it.

The failure to address it stripped the election of any validity. While the state

database may not be necessarily accurate, the November 6th absentee ballot record is

accurate. County Clerk English confirmed that the November 6th absentee ballot record was a
complete record of the names of all absentee voters who returned ballots. Chief Deputy
Hurst's investigation of the entire state database verified that it,possibly, could only be off by
four persons. If it is assumed that all of these four persons voted by absentee ballot the total
number of non-voided absentee ballots returned is six (6) fewer than were counted by
machine. Mr. Hurst testified that the November 6th absentee ballot record was the "only

evidence" of the number of absentee ballots.
Election workers failed to inform the mayor and council of the ballot discrepancy
before they "rubber stamped" an incorrect election result. The minutes of the election
'canvass' fail to even accurately document what occurred. This is an exclamation point at the
end of this haphazardly run election. The district court's gratuitous comment that the election
was well run, is not even remotely supported by the record. It appears to have been an
attempt to sway public perception against such a vile attack on American democratic process.
The City's total delegation of its election duties, in violation of the laws in effect since
1993, led to numerous fundamental errs. The County carelessly used UOCAVA application
forms to send out City absentee ballots to anyone who had in other election years had
requested county or federal election ballots. Absentee ballots were automatically sent to noncity residents who had not requested them. Residences were not verified.

The statutory

limitation that only City residents may legally vote in a city election was ridiculed by media
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and illegal voters alike. At least five non-city residents were sent and returned illegal
absentee ballots. The district court acknowledged that 'residence' under municipal law was
different than under state and county law, but was 'uncomfortable' holding that residency
requirements were different depending on whether it was a city or a count/state/federal
election. As a result it held that a permanent resident of Canada who had not resided in the
City since 1988 and four other non-city residents were legal voters in the City's election.
After the election duties were delegated to the County, the mayor and council believed
that it was no longer 'their' election but rather it was the County's election. They believed
that when the County delivered a vote tally it was their obligation to "rubber stamp" it. They
removed themselves from any investigation of election issues. The County's election
supervisor believed the resolution of all election issues was her sole responsibility. In her
discretion she ignored 'technical disqualifications' and allowed all votes.
The election process collapsed to a degree that would change the election result. The
single most appeal determinative error by the district court, after its refusal to grant the
motion to disqualify, was its failure to deduct the "Voided" absentee ballots returned from the
number of valid absentee ballots returned. Had it completed its computation and deducted the
"Voided" ballots it would have had to set aside the election. The district court's finding that
a total of 2051 absentee envelopes, each containing one valid absentee ballot, were returned
and thus the machine count of 2051 absentee ballots was correct, is not supported by any
evidence. When the six (6) absentee ballots that were returned and "Voided" are deducted
from the total returned, no sorcery can mathematically establish the existence of 2051 valid
absentee ballots to be counted. The fact that six (6) more absentee ballots were counted than
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non-voided ballots existed, under any interpretation of the evidence, is sufficient error to
change the result of a three (3) vote race.
Properly conducted and accurate elections are the cornerstone of any democracy.
Elections are the most significant means by which Idaho's diverse citizenry avoids social
discord. Without verifiable elections democracy will inevitably fall victim to power and
corruption. The decision should be reversed and remanded with directions to set aside the
election and order a new election held.

Respect~;:s ~day of September, 2011.
Starr Kelso, Attorney for Appellant Brannon
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